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I. INTRODUCTION: PUNISHMENT V. PREVENTION
The boundaries of the criminal justice system are eroding. A
vast amount of relatively innocuous behavior is now criminalized. 1
The line between criminal penalties and administrative sanctions is
dissolving, as criminal law relaxes its mens rea requirements and
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric Levin College of
Law. A version of this Article was presented at the American Association of Law Schools
Professional Development Conference on Criminal Law & Procedure, Washington, D.C., July
2000, and at workshops at the University of Florida Levin College of Law and at Hastings
College of Law. The author would like to thank Mark Fondacaro, Wayne Logan, WilliamPage,
Judge Michael Marcus, Michael Seigel, Scott Sundby, and Lois Weithorn for their comments.
1. See Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 45, 74 (1998) (describing federal laws that penalize, inter alia, selling "a mixture of two
kinds of turpentine"); '"'William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 515-16 (2001) (describing laws that penalize, inter alia, cheating at cards and making
homosexual propositions); Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1995, at 72, 77 ("[C]riminal law is increasingly used against purely regulatory offenses,
such as those involving the activities permitted in public parks, the maintenance procedures at
warehouses, and the foodstuffs that may be imported into a state.").
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government bureaucracies aggressively pursue regulatory violations. 2
Distinctions between criminal and civil forfeiture, contempt, and
deportation proceedings have been vanishingly subtle for some time.3
Perhaps the most serious assault on the integrity of today's
criminal justice system, however, is the increasing prominence of the
"dangerousness criterion" as justification for confinement by the
government. Governmental deprivations of liberty have usually been
the province of the criminal law, which is generally defined by a
commitment to punishing individuals for their past acts based on the
principle of just deserts. 4  Constraints on liberty based upon
dangerousness, in contrast, focus on the individual's future actions.5
These latter types of interventions contemplate neither punishment
nor an assessment of blameworthiness for previous conduct, and thus
directly flout the traditional premises of criminal justice.
This Article contends, contrary to the views of most legal
commentators, that this development ought to be encouraged. The
criminal law ought to embrace the dangerousness criterion, with the
significant caveat that it do so wholeheartedly rather than in the
halting manner it has exhibited to date. The punishment model of
criminal justice that views desert, general deterrence, or inculcation of
good character (or some combination of these three) as the primary
objective of criminal justice should be discarded, and individual
prevention should become the predominant goal of the criminal justice
system.
2. See, e.g., Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal
Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025
(describing the proliferation of "hybrid" regulatory statutes that allow their provisions to be
enforced through either criminal prosecutions or civil suits).
3. Gino F. Ercolino, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell: Further Clarification of Civil and
Criminal Contempt, 22 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 291, 292 (1996) ("It has never
been easy for courts to classify a contempt as either civil or criminal."); Michelle Rae Pinzon, Was
the Supreme Court Right? A Closer Look at the True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 21st
Century, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 29, 49-64 (2003) (arguing that civil deportation proceedings are
criminal in nature); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Congressional Reform of Civil Forfeiture:
Punishing Criminals Yet Protecting Property Owners, 14 FED. SENTENCING REP. 71, 71 (2001)
(describing how civil forfeiture has become a tool for fighting crime and terrorism).
4. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
404-06 (1958) (stating that criminal law is distinguished from civil law in its power of moral
condemnation); Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law-A Dialogue, 29 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1980) ("It is deeply rooted in our moral sense of fitness that punishment entails
blame and that, therefore, punishment may not justly be imposed where the person is not
blameworthy.").
5. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness as a Criterion in the Criminal
Process, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER 360, 360-63 (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel
W. Shuman, eds., 1996) (examining how dangerousness plays a role in various stages of the
criminal system).
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The individual prevention rationale has long played a
secondary role in justifying confinement by the government, of course.
Pretrial detention, based on a prediction that an arrestee will commit
crime if released, is one obvious example of a setting in which
dangerousness determinations are the dominant consideration in
assessing whether a deprivation of liberty should occur. 6 Involuntary
hospitalization of people with mental illness is another illustration of
that phenomenon. 7  Indeterminate sentencing systems that base
sentence length on fitness for discharge into society is still another.8
But all of these practices are consistent with the traditional
punishment model of liberty deprivation represented by our current
criminal justice system. Pretrial detention is time-limited by the
criminal trial, at which a decision about whether to punish is made. 9
Traditional civil commitment is indeterminate, but it applies only to
persons for whom punishment is inappropriate under a just desert
analysis. Society is entitled to protect itself from severely mentally ill
people, classic theory states, because they are both unconvictable and
undeterrable. 10 And the indeterminate sentences popular in the mid-
twentieth century and still in place in many states today, although
imposed on people who are not mentally ill, immediately follow
conviction for a fault-defined antisocial act. Such sentences also
usually require a minimum term in prison that represents a
retributive penance, and often fix a maximum term as well, again
signifying a desert-based rationale. 1 Although a few statutes enacted
6. See, e.g., Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2000) (authorizing
preventive detention if necessary to "assure ... the safety of any other person and the
community").
7. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) ("[T]he state.., has authority under its
police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally
ill.").
8. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1972) (describing jurisdictions in which
"parole is granted by the discretionary action of a board, which evaluates an array of information
about a prisoner and makes a prediction whether he is ready to reintegrate into society").
9. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,747 (1987) (holding that pretrial prevention
detention under the Federal Bail Reform Act is not punishment, in part because the length of
detention is limited by the Speedy Trial Act).
10. See Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1201, 1233 (1974) (The group composed of the dangerous criminally insane "contains
individuals whose mental condition excludes them from the operation of the traditional
punishment-deterrence system, because they are both unable to make autonomous decisions
about their antisocial behavior and unaffected by the prospect of punishment").
11. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
STRUCTURED SENTENCING 2 (1996) (describing as the "traditional form" of indeterminate
sentencing a system under which "the judge specifies a maximum and minimum duration that is
set by statute" and a second form in which "the judge specifies only the maximum sentence




in the early to mid-twentieth century permitted "commitment" of
"defective delinquents," "sex psychopaths," or "mentally disordered sex
offenders" in the absence of conviction, 12  until recently most
jurisdictions rejected this approach, instead requiring either a serious
mental illness or a conviction for an offense and a sentence range
informed by desert principles before dangerousness could be
considered a justification for indeterminate confinement.
Today, however, we are witnessing the widespread
promulgation of new incapacitation regimes that fall outside these
traditional confines. Exhibit One is the so-called sexual predator
scheme, upheld against constitutional challenge by the Supreme Court
in Kansas v. Hendricks in 1997.13 These statutes, now law in close to
twenty jurisdictions-with fifteen of them enacted since 1990 14-permit
long-term post-sentence confinement based on a finding of
dangerousness. In a possible bow to the classic mental illness
limitation on indeterminate commitment, these statutes require that
the dangerousness result from "mental abnormality" that affects
volitional or emotional capacities and "predisposes" the person to
sexual offending. 15 But, as applied, this language merely ensures that
the person is unusually dangerous.1 6 It does not require the kind of
incapacity-to-be-responsible showing that triggers traditional civil
commitment; for instance, Leroy Hendricks, whose indeterminate
commitment (after he had served his sentence for child molestation)
12. See George E. Dix, Special Dispositional Alternatives for Abnormal Offenders:
Developments in the Law, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 133, 134-40 (John Monahan & Henry Steadman eds., 1983) (describing laws in
sixteen states and the District of Columbia).
13. 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
14. W. Lawrence Fitch & Debra A. Hammen, The New Generation of Sex Offender
Commitment Laws: Which States Have Them and How Do They Work?, in PROTECTING SOCIETY
FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 27, 33 tbl. 1.1 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La Fond eds.,
2003) (showing sixteen states with sexual predator laws). Although passage of such laws has
slowed in the past five years, Pennsylvania recently enacted a sexual predator law, bringing the
number of such laws to seventeen. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6402 (2004). Additionally, at least one
state (Colorado) authorizes indeterminate, potentially lifelong, sentences for sex offenders. Fitch
& Hammen, supra, at 36.
15. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (2003) (defining "mental abnormality" as a
"congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes
the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to
the health and safety of others").
16. See Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender Commitments: Debunking the Official Narrative and
Revealing the Rules-in-Use, 8 STAN. L. & POLy REV. 71, 81 (1997) (describing survey of
Minnesota sex offender cases finding that the courts' "utter lack of power to control" test has no
"justificatory power" and that, in application, the mental disorder element "becomes a legal
fiction, an element of proof that must be invoked, but that does not do any substantive work in
the litigation").
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was upheld by the Court in Hendricks, clearly was not insane under
any of the traditional formulations. 17
Akin to indeterminate sentencing schemes, the sexual predator
statutes usually apply only to people who have already committed a
sexual offense. But that offense may have taken place years prior to
the commitment, as Hendricks illustrates, most sexual predator
detentions occur after the person has served his sentence for the sex
offense.' 8 Most importantly, there is no minimum or maximum
"sentence" for the sexual predator; release is based entirely on a
demonstration that it is safe to do so.19
Although the sexual predator craze is the most conspicuous
proof that the dangerousness criterion is on the loose, plenty of other
evidence exists. In 1986, California enacted a statute that permits
postsentence confinement of any offender-not just one convicted of sex
crimes-who is considered dangerous because of "mental disorder."20
Use of the word "disorder" is significant because, in contrast to the
"mental illness" that is the predicate for traditional civil commitment,
mental disorder could apply to any of the 300-plus diagnoses found in
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders. 21 At the least, any prisoner with a
personality disorder could easily fit in this category, which means that
at least half of all offenders might be eligible for preventive detention
under this type of statute. 22 At least one other state is considering
17. Hendricks was never found insane despite multiple criminal trials for molestation,
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353-55, and his prevalent diagnosis was pedophilia, a non-psychotic
impulse disorder that rarely if ever forms the basis for a successful insanity defense. See
generally Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis,
4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505, 529-30 (1998) (describing why sex offenders should not be found
insane).
18. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 (affirming Hendricks' post-sentence commitment). See
generally Fitch & Hammen, supra note 14, at 28-30 (describing laws that permit "postsentence
civil commitment of sex offenders"). Moreover, nothing in the Court's opinion in Hendricks
requires proof of any particular violation of the criminal code; so long as there is proof that the
person is, to use the Court's cryptic phrase, "dangerous beyond [his] control," Hendricks, 521 U.S.
at 358, commitment is justified.
19. Id. at 363 (noting that the duration of confinement under sexual predator statutes is
"linked to the stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his mental
abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others.").
20. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960-2981 (2005).
21. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS-
TEXT REVISED xxx-xxxi (4th ed. 2000) (defining "mental disorder").
22. Robert D. Hare, Diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder in Two Prison Populations,




similar legislation, 23 and both Canada and the United Kingdom have
passed dangerous offender laws.24
Unshackled from the traditional mental illness and sentence-
range limitations, the emergence of the dangerousness criterion as a
basis for confinement by the government could spell the end of the
criminal justice system as we know it. As one commentator stated,
"the logic of the predator commitment law can be applied to people
who drive while under the influence of alcohol, who assault their
domestic partners or children, who use crack cocaine, or who commit
whatever the new 'crime-of-the-month' happens to be." 25  Perhaps
Justice Stevens put it best in his dissent in Allen v. Illinois26 when he
noted that such laws presaged the development of a "shadow" criminal
code that permits the state, after nabbing a perpetrator, to choose
between punishment for a crime or incapacitation based on danger. 27
Most commentators have, along with Justice Stevens,
bemoaned this development. 28 In a previous article, I have joined this
group, arguing that the two-track regime described by Justice Stevens
is repugnant to our society's most fundamental premises, precisely
because it consists of two tracks. 29 Such a system strongly fosters the
perception-a perception that can become a self-fulfilling prophecy-
that those who are shunted off the punishment track to the
commitment track are less than human. Under this type of system,
those relegated to commitment are treated, not as autonomous actors
who deserve to be punished for their choices, but as harmful,
uncontrollable animals who must be caged under a special detention
law, an image the "sexual predator" label captures perfectly.
23. The Michigan legislature is evaluating a similar statute. Fitch & Hammen, supra note
14, at 38; see also Tabor v. State, 864 So. 2d 1171, 1174-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2004)
(finding that predicate offense for sexual predator commitment need not be a sexual offense).
24. See R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 753 (2005) (Can.) (authorizing indeterminate confinement
for a "dangerous offender," defined as a perpetrator of a serious crime against person who
"constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons");
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 226 (Eng.) (authorizing imposition of life sentence or
indeterminate sentence on an offender for whom "there is a significant risk to members of the
public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by him of further specified offences").
25. John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of
the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 698-99 (1992).
26. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
27. Id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., Dawn J. Post, Preventive Victimization: Assessing Future Dangerousness in
Sexual Predators for Purposes of Indeterminate Civil Commitment, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POLVY 177, 180 (1999) (stating that "[o]ver one hundred fifty articles have been published
opposing... sexual predator legislation").
29. Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 28-31
(2003).
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By this logic, however, the dehumanization objection would not
obtain if intervention based on dangerousness were the government's
only liberty-depriving response to antisocial behavior. Then invidious
comparisons with a second, "autonomous" group worthy of blame
cannot occur. A system of liberty deprivation that takes the
dangerousness criterion as the sole predicate for intervention would
not shadow the criminal code but instead constitute it.
This Article explores the jurisprudential and practical
feasibility of such a system, what I will call a "preventive" regime of
justice. More specifically, this Article examines an updated version of
the type of government intervention espoused four decades ago by
thinkers such as Barbara Wooton,30 Sheldon Glueck, 31 and Karl
Menninger. 32 These individuals, the first a criminologist, the latter
two mental health professionals, envisioned a system that is triggered
by an antisocial act but that pays no attention to desert, or even to
general deterrence. Rather, like sexual predator regimes, the sole goal
of the system they proposed is individual prevention through
assessments of dangerousness and the provision of treatment designed
to reduce it. However, unlike the sexual predator scheme at issue in
Hendricks, a preventive regime would not countenance a two-track
system involving "punishment" and "commitment;" the intervention
would take place immediately after the antisocial act, rather than
after completion of a criminal sentence. A preventive regime is also
different from a system that follows conviction with an indeterminate
sentencing, because it considers gradations of culpability irrelevant at
the threshold of intervention as well as at the dispositional stage. As
Lady Wooton imagined it, once the "obsession with the punitive [is]
dispelled, the courts could be free to deal with every lawbreaker in
whatever way, consonant with the moral standards of the community,
seemed best calculated to discourage future lawbreaking. Their eyes
would on the future, not on the past."33
Some modern modifications of Lady Wooton's proposal, mostly
semantic, need to be made. Today, social scientists talk about risk
assessment, not predicting dangerousness, to connote the idea that the
potential for violence is not something that resides solely in the
30. BARBARA WOOTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 32-84 (1963).
31. SHELDON GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIALE? 133-174
(1962).
32. KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 190-218 (1966). For perhaps the earliest
work advocating this approach, see ENRICO FERRI, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY (1917). See also G.H.
Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, 23 AM. J. SOC. 577 (1918).




individual, but rather stems from the interaction of biological,
psychological, and social variables.3 4 A clinician evaluating someone
in a prevention regime would look for "risk factors" that correlate with
antisocial behavior, some of which are static, such as age, gender and
prior antisocial history, and some of which are dynamic or changeable,
such as rage reactions, substance abuse, family and peer dynamics,
and the proximity of certain people. 35 As detailed later in this
Article, 36 risk assessment techniques, long lambasted for their
inaccuracy, have improved substantially in recent years.
Social scientists also talk about "risk management," not
incapacitation or control, which gets across the notion that the best
disposition is the one that manages the dynamic, or changeable, risk
factors. 37 The ultimate goals of risk management, in terms that a
student of the criminal law would understand, are specific deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation. Incapacitative interventions under
a risk management approach need not occur in a confined space, but
rather can take place in the community-albeit sometimes under strict
monitoring-and in any event are ongoing and flexible rather than set
at the front end.38  The permissible dispositions are legion. In
addition to formal rehabilitation programs and prison, they can
include restitution, fines and forfeitures, community service,
contempt-backed peace orders, and other probationary conditions, as
long as the focus remains individual prevention. Thus, the system
examined in this Article is one that rejects culpability assessments
and instead looks at whether an offender's risk factors indicate a
potential for harm to others, in which case appropriate management
in the community or, if necessary, through incapacitation in an
institution, occurs. The contours of this prevention system will be
fleshed out in subsequent pages.
The ultimate objective of this Article is to present a defense of a
prevention system as a replacement for, rather than in addition to, our
current criminal justice system. The Supreme Court upheld the sexual
predator scheme in Hendricks, despite its forward-looking nature,
34. See, e.g., Kirk Heilbrun, Prediction Versus Management Models Relevant to Risk
Assessment: The Importance of Legal Decision-Making Context, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 347, 351-
53 (1997).
35. For a current treatment of risk assessment, see JOHN MONAHAN, RETHINKING RISK
ASSESSMENT (2001) (discussing "criminological" risk factors, "clinical" risk factors, and methods
of customizing risk assessment).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 109-112.
37. Heilbrun, supra note 34, at 352-53.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 124-133.
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because it deemed the scheme "civil" rather than "criminal."3 9
Assuming some significant modifications of the model the Court
sanctioned, a preventive system may indeed be a more civil method of
dealing with antisocial conduct than the current desert-based
approach, a notion captured by Karl Menninger's famous title, "The
Crime of Punishment. 4 °
Such a defense of a purely preventive regime has been rare in
the legal literature since the 1960s, when just deserts philosophy
became popular and preventive approaches fell into disrepute.41 Since
then, a number of conceptual and empirical advances have made the
issue even more complex. The case for a preventive regime
nonetheless deserves serious consideration in the twenty-first century,
as an increasing number of jurisdictions adopt harsh determinate
sentencing based on desert principles, 42 and in the wake of the
American Law Institute's recent announcement that its planned
revision of the Model Penal Code will forsake the original Code's focus
on reform of prisoners and instead endorse a just deserts approach to
sentencing. 43
Part II of the Article looks at jurisprudential objections to a
prevention regime, which all center on its perceived failure to do
"justice." It contends that such a regime would neither slight human
dignity nor undermine the general deterrence and character-shaping
39. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997) (holding the Kansas sexual predator
law to be "civil in nature").
40. See supra note 32.
41. See generally Marc F. Plattner, The Rehabilitation of Punishment, 44 PUB. INT. 104
(1976) (describing the attacks on rehabilitation-oriented imprisonment in the early 1970s and
the emergence of the just deserts movement among liberals and conservatives).
42. See TODD R. CLEAR, HARM IN AMERICAN PENOLOGY: OFFENDERS, VICTIMS, AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES xiv (1994) (describing the current penal era as "a time period of the most extreme
increases in penal harm in our history"). Andrew von Hirsch, one of the leading proponents of
just deserts philosophy, proposed a five-year maximum for homicide and a maximum of three
years for all other serious offenses. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 36-46
(1993). In contrast, in 1998 under the determinate sentencing policies extant in federal courts,
five years was the average sentence for all offenses (including immigration, fraud, and
prostitution, which constituted over 25% of the total cases), the average sentence for murder was
over twenty years, the average sentence for kidnapping was 13 years, and the average sentence
for robbery was just under ten years. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, , DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl.5.38 (2000). The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004), which requires that any
aggravating factor that enhances a sentence be decided by a jury, may call for substantial
revision of the procedures associated with determinate sentencing regimes, but is unlikely to
lead to their disappearance. See Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's Federal Aftermath, 16 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 333, 338-39 (2004) (concluding that the most likely Congressional response
will be to amend federal Guidelines "to raise all Guidelines maxima up to the statutory maxima,
but leave Guidelines minima in place.").
43. KEVIN R. REITZ, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, PLAN FOR REVISION 16-28 (2002).
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goals of the criminal law. Part III examines concerns about the
feasibility of a preventive system, including questions about the
accuracy of predictions, the efficacy of treatment, and the costs of a
reform-oriented justice system. It concludes that these concerns are
overstated and in any event are less serious than the practical
problems that afflict the punishment model. Finally, Part IV
describes one further reason for favoring prevention over traditional
punishment: a preventive regime is much better at assimilating the
proliferation of scientific findings that call into question humans'
ability to control their actions, which is the central premise of a
punishment system based on desert.
The view taken in this Article is exploratory, however. For a
number of reasons, legal and sociological, one might be ambivalent
about instituting a full-blown preventive regime, at least in the
immediate future. Accordingly, the conclusion to the Article, Part V,
suggests a transitional compromise, which maintains culpability as
the threshold for government intervention, and reserves application of
the preventive model for disposition, in what amounts to a modern
version of indeterminate sentencing.
II. JURISPRUDENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE PREVENTIVE MODEL
The most fundamental argument against a prevention regime
is simply that it goes against everything we stand for. This argument
has several versions: deontological, quasi-consequentialist, and
straightforwardly consequentialist. Here it is subdivided into
contentions made by retributivists (those who view punishment of
offenders as morally obligatory), rule utilitarians (those who subscribe
to general deterrence theories), and virtue ethicists (those who believe
punishment is justified because it inculcates virtue).
A. Retributivist Objections
Michael Moore puts the deontological case most forcefully with
his arguments in favor of noninstrumental retributivism. He arrives
at his position in favor of backward-looking desert-driven intervention
primarily through thought experiments, one of which explicitly
contrasts a preventive regime with a retributive one. Imagine, he
hypothesizes, that a psychiatrist discovers that a particular patient
has extremely dangerous propensities. 44 The patient also happens to
44. MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 238-39
(1984).
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be the accused in a criminal trial but, it turns out, is completely
innocent and has never committed any crime. Under utilitarian
theory, Moore notes, as long as the judge is the only one who knows
about both the psychiatrist's opinion and the patient's innocence, and
as long as the prediction is reliable and the harm predicted is
sufficiently serious, the person should be punished. 45 Yet Moore
conjectures that most of us would consider that conclusion
inappropriate, because it would involve punishing an innocent
person. 46
Moore is probably right that even many adamant utilitarians
would not want to punish an innocent person who is merely predicted
to be harmful, except perhaps when the utility of doing so is
tremendous. But he skews the issue by using the word "punish." By
definition, we cannot punish someone unless he has committed a
crime, or at least we say he has committed one.47 That does not mean
that we are unwilling to authorize coercive government intervention
against an innocent person. Consider a more realistic thought
experiment, involving an individual who has molested children on
several occasions and has been convicted for those crimes. The term of
his last sentence, based on desert, is just about to expire.
Psychiatrists believe that if released he will molest again, and indeed
the person himself says that the only way he will stop abusing
children is "to die." These are the facts of Hendricks,48 and many of us
would vote enthusiastically for a stringent risk management program
in his case even if he were innocent of any unpunished crime.
Of course, under the prevention regime examined in this
Article, Hendricks's child molestation would have subjected him to
risk management immediately. Although Hendricks would not be
"innocent" under this scenario (for he has not yet served a sentence for
his crime), Moore and many retributivists would still object to any
intervention based on a prediction of danger. To them, this type of
"nonpunitive" disposition would violate Hendricks's right to be
punished, or at least breach society's obligation to punish. Moore's
murky case for this requirement of punishment is based on an
45. Id. at 239.
46. Id. He concludes: "Such thought experiments.., show almost all of us that we are not
pure utilitarians about punishment." Id. at 240.
47. Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001) ("[I]t is impossible to 'punish dangerousness.'...
[P]unishment can only exist in relation to a past wrong.").
48. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 354-55 (1997).
2005]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
assessment of our emotional reaction to crime, 49 a topic discussed
below.50 The more widely cited explanation for this stance comes from
other commentators, using a somewhat more instrumental set of
arguments than Moore. For instance, Herbert Morris would insist on
desert-based punishment because it is necessary to affirm the dignity
of the offender through recognition of him as a responsible human
actor,51 while Jean Hampton argues that punishment is required as a
societal affirmation of the victim's worth in the face of the criminal's
demeaning attack.52
Neither the dignity of offenders nor that of victims is
dependent upon desert-based punishment, however. Risk
management, properly conducted, explores the causes of antisocial
behavior and continuously stresses the offender's ability to change
that behavior through cognitive restructuring, avoidance of risky
behavior (such as drinking, or fraternizing with gang members), and
adjusting relationships. 53 As modern rehabilitative efforts routinely
demonstrate, a regime based on prediction does not have to insult the
notion that past choices have consequences and that the offender is
responsible and held accountable for them.54 There is a difference in
message, however. The punishment model says to the offender: "You
have done something bad, for which you must pay." The prevention
49. See generally Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER AND EMOTIONS 214 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (arguing that feelings of guilt
"engender the judgment that we deserve punishment ... that we ought to be punished").
50. See infra text accompanying notes 78-82.
51. HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY 46 (1976) (arguing that the difference between a punishment system and a therapy
system can be expressed "in terms of the one system treating one as a person and the other not").
52. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 125 (Jeffrie G.
Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988) (arguing that punishment is not for the sake of the
criminal but to affirm the worth of the victim because, imposed proportionate to the seriousness
of the criminal's wrongdoing, it "symbolizes the correct relative value of wrongdoer and victim").
53. For a description of one very effective risk management program that uses these types
of methods (called Multisystemic Therapy), see CURT R. BARTOL, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: A
PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH 400-01 (5th ed. 1999).
54. Consider this standard statement about treatment in connection with sex offenders:
We have now recognized that as with other kinds of craving disorders (e.g.,
alcoholism, substance abuse, and compulsive gambling), it is not a person's fault that
he or she suffers from the problem. It is that person's responsibility, however, to seek
help, and one way to begin that process is with the person's admission of a lack of
adequate self-control and a need for proper assistance.
Fred S. Berlin, The Etiology and Treatment of Sexual Offending, in THE SCIENCE, TREATMENT,
AND PREVENTION OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIORS: APPLICATION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 21-
28 (Diane H. Fishbein ed., 2000); see also Scott M. Solkoff, Judicial Use Immunity and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NOVA L. REV.
1441, 1485 (1993) ("[Nlumerous therapy professionals ... have found acceptance of responsibility
not to be a preference, but to be required in order for meaningful change to occur.").
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model says: "You have done something harmful, which you must not
let happen again." In terms of how they treat their children, many
parents would probably prefer the latter message to the former;
arguably government officials in charge of responding to antisocial
behavior should as well.55
The message that the offender has caused harm should also
affirm the worth of the person he has harmed. Indeed, restorative
justice programs designed to facilitate reintegration of the offender
into the community transmit this message much more concretely than
the traditional punishment model ever could, by organizing group
conferences at which both offender and victim are present. A primary
goal of such conferences, in the words of one proponent, is "to give
offenders a sense of the consequences of their actions and an
understanding of how victims feel" in an effort to humanize and
dignify both offender and victim 56 (which in turn has been found to
reduce recidivism by increasing remorse, reconciliation, and self-
esteem57).
For a subset of victims, the message a prevention regime sends
is even more complex, in a way that is, again, probably preferable to
the message a punishment regime communicates. The punishment
model often sets up a false dichotomy between the victim and the
offender by suggesting that the offender deserves blame, while the
victim is, well, innocent. In fact, much crime is intrafamilial or results
from other types of prolonged interaction between offender and
victim. 58 In some of these situations, a risk management approach
might involve the "victim" as well as the offender, and both would
have to accept proportionate responsibility for their actions. 59 In other
55. Cf. John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or a Third "Model" of the Criminal
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 367, 371-91 (1970) (proposing a "Family Model" of criminal justice that
derives "from a genuine acceptance of the idea that criminals are just people who are deemed to
have offended-that we are all of us both actual and potential criminals-that 'criminals' are not a
special kind and class of people with a unique relation to the state").
56. Gabrielle Maxwell & Allison Morrris, The Role of Shame, Guilt, and Remorse in
Restorative Justice Processes for Young People, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 267, 279 (Elmar G.M.
Weitekamp & Hans-Jurgen Kerner eds., 2002).
57. Id. at 280. It should also be noted that the notion that punishment is necessary to bring
emotional closure for the victim is suspect at best. See DEBBIE MORRIS, FORGIVING THE DEAD
MAN WALKING 251 (1998) (describing a victim's search for solace after execution of her assailant,
and concluding, "Justice didn't do a thing to heal me. Forgiveness did.").
58. As two researchers concluded after a study of violence among people with disorders, it is
a mistake ... to conceptualize violence as a characteristic of a person without giving equal
attention to the underlying or concurrent interpersonal and clinical processes and contexts." Sue
E. Estroff & Catherine Zimmer, Social Networks, Social Support, and Violence Among Persons
with Severe, Persistent Mental Illness, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN
RISK ASSESSMENT 259 (John Monahan & Henry Steadman eds., 1994).
59. This is, of course, a common premise in marital and other types of dyadic therapy.
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words, the prevention model treats crime in context, not as an isolated
event or the result solely of one individual's actions. To social
scientists that is a much more accurate perspective on our "crime
problem" and one that therefore ought to be communicated. 60
This discussion of offenders and victims does gloss over some
important tensions triggered by the prevention model, however. First,
most of the time the victim truly is innocent and the offender clearly is
the only harming actor, yet on some of these occasions the offender
will not be considered a risk. If the government avoided intervention
in such cases, as the prevention model counsels, then no government
affirmation either of the offender's responsibility or of the victim's
worth occurs. Conversely, some offenders, because they are
dangerous, would be subject to intervention under a prevention
regime even though they lack the relevant mental state or were
justified in their actions. As in Moore's unlikely but nonetheless
possible hypothetical, a person might also be considered dangerous
even though he has never committed an antisocial act.
In these situations, the moral message communicated by a
prevention system would admittedly be ambiguous. Using these kinds
of examples, Paul Robinson has posited that a system that ignores the
human urge to gauge blame-to condemn or withhold condemnation
based on assessments of culpability-would lack "moral credibility"
with the public. 61 Dissatisfaction with the law and with authorities
who intervene (or fail to intervene) in ways the public perceives as
unjust might, in turn, lead to less willingness to comply with rules set
by those authorities. 62 These are plausible speculations. But there is
simply not enough information about how people think about crime to
say much more than that.
60. See generally URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE AND DESIGN 3-42 (1979) (arguing that efforts to understand and
change human behavior must take into consideration the interrelated social contexts in which
behavior occurs).
61. Robinson, supra note 47, at 1434 (2001) ("[The use of the criminal justice system as the
primary mechanism for preventing future crimes seriously perverts the goals of our institutions
of justice.").
62. See id. at 1444:
As criminal liability is increasingly disconnected from moral blameworthiness, the
criminal law can exercise less moral authority to change norms or to cause the
internalization of norms. In the long run .... using the criminal justice system as a
mechanism for preventive detention may undercut the very crime prevention goal
that is offered to justify such use.
See also Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 451, 457 (1997):
("The extent of the criminal law's effectiveness in ... gaining compliance in borderline cases... is
to a great extent dependent on the degree of moral credibility that the criminal law has achieved
in the minds of the citizens governed by it.").
[Vol. 58:1:121134
2005] CIVILIZATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 135
Take first the claim that preventive detention is repugnant to
the typical layperson. Evidence for that assertion is slim. Even the
current two-track system that accentuates the difference between a
desert-based regime and a preventive one does not seem to have
caused much public concern. The electorate has fervidly endorsed
sexual predator laws that explicitly eschew assessments of
blameworthiness and recidivist statutes that implicitly do so. 63 Nor is
it likely that a public obsessed with its safety, as ours is,64 would be
very upset by elimination of defenses based on excuse and elimination
of subtle gradations of mens rea. As it is, many people had a hard
time understanding why John Hinckley was "acquitted,"65 and do not
seem to be bothered by significant sentences based on negligent
actions, as Robinson's own empirical work demonstrates. 66
That being said, modification of the prevention regime to take
into account some of the stronger intuitions of the public might be
wise. For instance, one could supplement the act threshold required
by Wooton 67 by limiting intervention to those who have committed a
harmful or potentially harmful act that is both nonaccidental and
unjustified. As an empirical matter, a person who has not done (or
tried) anything harmful or whose harmful act is inadvertent or
justifiable is unlikely to be considered a risk in any event, and a
person who does meet these conditions is likely to pose some risk.
63. On the popularity of legislation regarding sexual predators, see supra text
accompanying notes 13-15. A good illustration of the public's reaction to three-time loser laws
comes from California, where public outrage over the legislature's failure to pass such a statute
resulted in Proposition 184, "one of the fastest qualifying propositions in state history," which
passed with 72 percent of the vote. Nathan H. Seltzer, When the Tail Wags the Dog: The
Collision Course Between Recidivism Statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 83 B.U. L. REV.
921, 922 (2003).
64. Even citizens in countries with lower crimes rates share this obsession. See generally
HOME OFFICE, MAKING PUNISHMENTS WORK: REPORT OF A REVIEW OF THE SENTENCING
FRAMEWORK FOR ENGLAND AND WALES app.5, at 108 (July 2001), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/halliday.html ('"The general public [is] very clear about what
they want sentencing to achieve: a reduction in crime."). See also infra note 76 and
accompanying text.
65. MICHAEL PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 13 (1994) ('CThe
public's outrage over a jurisprudential system that could allow a defendant who shot an
American president on national television to plead 'not guilty' (for any reason) became a 'river of
fury' after the jury's verdict was announced.").
66. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 169-81 (1995) (discussing a study finding subjects willing to
impose murder conviction on person who negligently kills during a felony); id. at 84-96
(discussing a study finding that subjects were willing to impose punishment for negligent actions
outside the homicide context).
67. See Wooton, supra note 33, at 1029 ("The purpose of the trial would be to establish
responsibility in a purely physical sense for the actus reus without reference to the presence, or
absence, of malicious intent.").
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Regardless of empirical considerations, however, limiting intervention
to those who commit or attempt harm and lack objective justification
for doing so might be warranted as a method of minimizing the public
dissatisfaction Robinson hypothesizes. It is also more congruent with
the principle of legality.68
This type of "shallow" prohibition is probably as far as one
needs to go to address Robinson's concerns about preventive detention,
however. Indeed, this approach is not inconsistent with Robinson's
own suggestion that the best method of informing the public about
criminal law norms is through what he calls "rules of conduct," which
state in simple language the criminal law's prohibitions.69 Under
Robinson's scheme, more complex "adjudication rules," which would
incorporate the gradations required by desert, would govern
prosecutions of offenders, but only conduct rules would constitute the
criminal law as far as the rest of the public is concerned. 70 And, as
Robinson notes, "most mental elements are culpability mental
elements, which function as principles of adjudication," 71 not rules of
conduct. Thus, Robinson's conduct rules would simply stipulate that
people should not kill, rape or steal, or try to kill, rape, or steal,
without the finely-tuned mens rea terms currently found in criminal
codes. 72 That is precisely what a code in a preventive regime would
look like.
With these adjustments, public discontent with a government
that refuses to play the blame game is most likely to arise, not from
confinement of the "non-culpable," but from failure to treat harshly
enough those perceived to be "culpable." Here again, however, we
must speculate, and what little evidence we have suggests that
outrage over "lenient" treatment of serious offenders would not be
extensive. The current criminal justice system routinely dismisses
68. See Slobogin, supra note 29, at 20-26 (discussing why the principle of legality requires
that preventive detention be preceded by harmful or obviously risk conduct).
69. See generally Paul Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 729 (1990).
70. Id. at 731 ("The rules of conduct function gives the general population ex ante direction
as to what they can, must, and must not do. The principles of adjudication function gives
decisionmakers (i.e., prosecutors, juries, and judges) guidance in assessing ex post the
blameworthiness of an individual's violation of the rules."). Robinson notes at another point:
"Wide dissemination of the principles of adjudication is not necessary either to condemn violation
of or to gain compliance with the rules of conduct." Id. at 770.
71. Id. at 743.
72. Here are examples of conduct rules that Robinson proposes: "No person shall engage in
conduct that creates a risk of death to another person;" "No person shall engage in intercourse or
make sexual contact with or expose his genitals to another person without such other person's
consent;" "No person shall take, exercise control over, or transfer property of another without
consent of the owner." Id. at 760.
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charges or reduces sentences on lack-of-danger grounds without
significant social disgruntlement. 73  Death penalty research
consistently finds that even the decision to forego imposition of the
ultimate punishment rests on assessments of relative dangerousness
more than any other factor. 74
None of this is meant to deny that desert analysis often plays a
prominent role in lay evaluation of the appropriate disposition of
individual cases.75 But surveys suggest that, when asked to view
dispositional issues in the abstract, the American public believes that
specific deterrence and crime reduction is at least as important as
giving offenders what they deserve. 76 At best, it is unresolved whether
a system explicitly devoted to the former goal would undermine public
confidence in the criminal justice system, much less its willingness to
comply with the law, especially given the close relationship of
dangerousness and moral culpability. 77
73. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 102-03 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that the
proportion of pretrial diversions to rehabilitation programs may "come close to equaling the
number convicted of the crime" and also noting that diversion of those charged with felonies can
range from 5 to 20 percent, depending on the jurisdiction); id. at 145 (noting that as a result of
parole and good time credits prisoners only serve between 40 to 60 percent of the mean
maximum sentence).
74. For research on capital jury decisionmaking that comes to this conclusion, see Aletha
Claussen-Schulz et al., Attitudes, Evidence, Jury Instructions, and Offender Dangerousness:
Which Paths Point to Death? (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); Sally Costanzo &
Mark Costanzo, Life or Death Decision: An Analysis of Capital Jury Decision Making Under the
Special Issues Sentencing Framework, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1994); James Luginbuhl &
Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J.
1161, 1178-79 tbls.5,6 (1995). The general public's reasons for supporting the death penalty are
less clear. Compare Wayne Logan, Casting New Light on an Old Subject: Death Penalty
Abolitionism for a New Millennium, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1336, 1338 n.19 (2002) (citing polling
research indicating that the most common reason for support of the death penalty is the "eye for
an eye" rationale), with Michael L. Radelet, More Trends Toward Moratoria on Executions, 33
CONN. L. REV. 845, 856 (2001) (noting that support for the death penalty drops "precipitously"
when life-without-parole is provided as an alternative).
75. See, e.g., John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for
Punishment, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) (summarizing studies that suggest that
subjects' "standard sentencing motive was based more in just deserts than in incapacitation").
76. Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion about Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME &
JUST. 1, 34 (2000) (reporting research finding that while "offense seriousness scores explained
the largest amount of variation in sentencing preferences" exhibited by those surveyed, "when
respondents were asked in a separate question what was the purpose of the sentence they
assigned to the offender in the vignette, the goal of just deserts ranked fourth behind special
deterrence, boundary setting, and rehabilitation as a 'very important' reason for choosing the
sentence"); Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Criminal Record, and the Sentencing Process, 39
AM. BEHAV. SCI. 488, 496-497 (1996) (finding that, for low or moderately serious crimes, people
are willing to abandon the retributive principle that punishment should be proportional to the
gravity of the crime).
77. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 66, at 14-28 (finding that lay people treat offenders
who show remorse more leniently, which could be due to an assessment that such offenders are
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Furthermore, we should ask whether the government ought to
be complicit in endorsing retributive notions, however universal they
may be, given their proximity to the coarse emotions of vengeance and
hatred. 78 Instead, perhaps, the government's treatment of antisocial
behavior ought to educate the citizenry about the extent to which
human behavior is a function of social as well as personal factors,
many of which may be beyond the immediate control or awareness of
the individual at the time of an offense. 79 Less willingness to look to
internal phenomena in apportioning blame may in turn result in
reduced perceptions of injustice, anger arousal, and the desire to
punish or inflict harm, not just on "criminals" but on any person who
is viewed as in the "wrong."80 As Neil Vidmar has suggested, punitive
reactions may beget punitive reactions, initiating a cycle of
recrimination and violence.81  The fact that everyone has these
emotions does not mean we should privilege them.8 2
less blameworthy or to the conclusion that they are less dangerous); Gary Watson, Two Faces of
Responsibility, 24 PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS 227 (1996) (noting that we tend to condemn most
severely that conduct which is seen as characteristic, i.e., conduct committed by the dangerous
person).
78. Retributivists recognize this problem. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals:
How Can Something That Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451-53 (1990)
(expressing discomfort with the "hate-the-criminal" justification for retributivism); Moore, supra
note 49, at 212-13 (trying to distinguish rage at wrongdoers from the more "virtuous" emotion of
guilt feelings as a basis for establishing the moral worth of retribution)'"'.
79. Cf. Mark R. Fondacaro, Toward an Ecological Jurisprudence Rooted in Concepts of
Justice and Empirical Research, 69 UMKC L. REV. 179, 192 (noting research "demonstrating the
powerful influences that situational factors have on guiding and directing individual behavior"
and arguing that "the legal system's near exclusive focus on the individual in attempting to
understand and analyze human nature is analogous to trying to understand and analyze the
nature of water by focusing exclusively on hydrogen atoms").
80. Research has established that most of us routinely attribute to individual choice actions
that are more likely the result of situational variables, a heuristic known as fundamental
attribution error. See generally Lee Ross et al., Social Roles, Social Control, and Biases in
Social-Perception Processes, 35 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 485, 485-500 (1977) (summarizing
studies that find observers significantly exaggerate the causal power of personality). A system
that de-emphasizes the importance of individual choice would tend to counteract this type of
error, which is less prevalent in societies with less punitive criminal regimes. See NEAL
FEIGENSEN, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 58 n. 15 (2000).
81. Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 27,
54 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2002) (hypothesizing that "punishment of the
offender might actually increase anger and cognitions of harm [by validating] the perception of
harm or remov[ing] any ambiguity about the motivation or character of the offender," although
noting there is no research on this issue); see also MENNINGER, supra note 32, at 214 (arguing
that vengeance evokes vengeance, "in and out of the courtroom").
82. Cf. FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS
AND OTHER ANIMALS 210 (1996) (theorizing, based on research with chimpanzees, that "many of
the sentiments and cognitive abilities underlying human morality antedate the appearance of
our species on this planet" and suggesting that assignments of blame may be a consequence of
genetically predisposed rage reactions).
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B. Deterrence-Based Objections
Retributivists are not the only group uncomfortable with the
preventive model of criminal justice. Henry Hart lodged a number of
objections to it, all centered on the goal of general deterrence. His
first concern was that the preventive approach would tend to
undermine deterrence because, given its forward-looking focus on the
dangerousness and treatability of individuals, it underemphasizes
general formulations of prohibited conduct.8 3  But a government
invested in prevention could easily generate a code which
straightforwardly sets out the harms that, if committed
nonaccidentally and unjustifiably, would be the subject of
intervention. That list of harms could be based on the same sort of
societal assessment of human and property values that goes into
drafting today's codes and, as noted above, probably would look little
different from today's criminal statutory framework, except that most
mens rea terms and the excuses would be absent.
Hart's second deterrence-related objection to a prevention
regime is more powerful. He wondered if the "public interest" would
be adequately protected "if the legislature is allowed only to say to
people, 'If you do not comply with any of these commands, you will
merely be considered to be sick and subjected to officially-imposed
rehabilitative treatment in an effort to cure you' [or, as a variation,]
'your own personal need for cure and rehabilitation will be the
predominant factor in determining what happens to you.' ,,84 An
effective deterrent, he suggested, is only likely to exist if the
legislature is enabled to say, "'If you violate any of these laws and the
violation is culpable, your conduct will receive the formal and solemn
condemnation of the community as morally blameworthy, and you will
be subjected to whatever punishment, or treatment, is appropriate to
vindicate the law and to further its various purposes.' "85
Hart failed to consider a fourth option that comes closer to the
legislative pronouncement that would occur in a preventive regime: "If
you do not comply with these commands, you will be subject to
83. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
407-08 (1958):
[A] curative rehabilitative theory of criminal justice tends always to depreciate, if not to deny
the significance of ... [the law's commands] .... The danger to society is that the
effectiveness of the general commands of the criminal law as instruments for influencing
behavior so as to avoid the necessity for enforcement proceedings will be weakened.
84. Id. at 408.
85. Id.
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intervention designed to prevent you from violating them again, which
may consist of restrictions on liberty as well as treatment designed to
ensure protection of the public." Because disposition is individualized
in a preventive system, the would-be first-time offender cannot know
how the government will react if he is caught, which may maximize
deterrence.8 6 Potential multiple offenders, in contrast, will probably
guess (often correctly) that the government's response will be
relatively tough if they are caught recidivating. If three-strikes laws
have had any crime-reducing effect at all, it is because two-time
offenders are well aware of the consequences of a third strike.8 7
Deterrence is an overrated rationale for punishment in any
event. With the exception of a short period in the 1990s and at the
present time, crime rates in the United States have been in an upward
surge since the mid-1960s, apparently unaffected by either
indeterminate or determinate sentencing approaches.88 Numerous
authors have questioned the fundamental premises of deterrent
theory, especially with respect to its assumptions that incremental
changes in punishment affect behavior and that we can figure out how
much deterrence we want.8 9  Empirical research is equally
unsupportive of nuanced deterrence theory. For instance, Tom Tyler's
studies indicate that most law-abiding people avoid crime not because
of fear of punishment, but because of their respect for the law and the
authorities who promulgate it.90 This finding perhaps argues for the
86. See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law is an Excuse--but Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 127, 137-41 (1997) (discussing "prudent obfuscation" and vague terminology as a means
of fostering law-abiding behavior). Note also that all well-informed putative criminals will know
that excuse defenses no longer exist under a preventive regime.
87. Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes' Overblown
Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 268-70 (2002) (reviewing FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL.,
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001))
(discussing the possible deterrent effect of such laws and reporting that one district attorney who
teaches inmates about Three Strikes stated, "There is no other topic of conversation within the
institutions other than the impact of [Three Strikes]").
88. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 106-107 (2001).
89. See, e.g., '"'Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
427 (1999) ("Deterrence, in short, presupposes a consequentialist theory of value. Yet nothing
intrinsic to the deterrence theory supplies one."); Neil Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95
MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2474-75 (1997) (suggesting that criminal penalties may actually increase
certain types of crime due to substitution, norming and other effects, and suggesting that, if the
difficulty of determining whether and when deterrence works is borne out, "other nondeterrent-
based approaches to criminal punishment should be explored"); Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When
Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 951 (2003) (asserting that the "effectiveness [of deterrence] rests
on a set of assumptions that on examination cannot be sustained").
90. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 168-69 (1990) (summarizing empirical
findings by concluding that "[i]n trying to understand why people follow the law.., we should
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sorts of community-sensitive modifications in the prevention model
that have already been discussed, but also suggests that deterrence
should not be the centerpiece of a crime prevention system. And a
considerable amount of research indicates that those people who tend
not to be law-abiding pay virtually no attention to the criminal law. 91
A recent contribution to this literature by David Anderson is
particularly potent because it relies on interviews of prisoners
themselves. Anderson found that the vast majority of the 278
criminals he sampled "either perceive no risk of apprehension or have
no thought about the likely punishments for their crimes" and that
virtually all are undeterred by harsher punishments because drugs,
psychosis, ego, revenge, or fight-or-flight impulses inhibit the desired
responses to traditional prevention methods.92  Only 11% of the
violent criminals and only 24% of the entire sample seemed responsive
to the prohibitions of the criminal law.93
In other words, most criminals are not the rational actors
favored by economic models.94 Thus, even if a preventive regime is, in
theory, a less effective deterrent than the current system, in practice
it may well be no worse. Furthermore, as discussed below,95 its
behavior-shaping effects on third parties (rational or not) may be
augmented by its relatively greater impact in social influence terms.
not assume that behavior responds primarily to reward and punishment (as do traditional
theories of deterrence) [but i]nstead should recognize that behavior is affected by the legitimacy
of legal authorities and the morality of the law").
91. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime?:
Deterrence, Incapacitation or Measurement Error? 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353, 353 (1998); Peter W.
Greenwood, Controlling the Crime Rate through Imprisonment, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY
253-55 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1984); Robinson & Darley, supra note 62, at 460 (noting, based on
research, that "[m] any, if not most, offenders" underestimate the probability of being caught, and
that "just as people notoriously place high discounts on rewards that exist far in the future, so
also do they on punishments.").
92. David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket's
Hanging, 4 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 295, 308 (2002).
93. Id; see also Ros Burnett & Shadd Maruna, So "Prison Works" Does It? The Criminal
Careers of 130 Men Released from Prison under Home Secretary, Michael Howard, 43 HOWARD J.
CRIM. JUST. 390 (2004) (concluding, based on a ten-year reconviction study of 130 males, that
recidivism and desistance from crime have little to do with "rational choice theory" or fear of
imprisonment).
94. Note, however, that even people whom we would regard as relatively "rational" do not
seem to be deterred by criminal sanctions. See generally SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME,
LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (2002) (describing a study concluding that on balance deterrence does
not work for corporations or their managers). Furthermore, to the extent deterrence does work
with such individuals, the potential for prosecution, by itself, may be sufficient. Cf. Steven G.
Bene, Why Not Fine Attorneys? An Economic Approach to Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43
STAN. L. REV. 863, 924-25 (1991) (arguing that attorneys ought to be deterrable simply by the
prospect of fines because they want to preserve the investment in their careers and stand to lose
much if caught committing a crime).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 146-151.
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In the meantime, risk management aimed at dealing with individual
substance abuse, mental disorder, and antisocial behavior patterns
are much more likely than a punishment model to prevent further
crime by the types of individuals Anderson describes.
Note that, by eschewing general deterrence as a rationale for
government intervention, the preventive regime also avoids one of the
main complaints about typical utilitarian approaches to punishment.
Government intervention meant to be an incentive for others to avoid
crime can result in "using" offenders, sometimes in a manner
disproportionate to either their culpability or dangerousness. 96 A
preventive regime, in contrast, is not justified by its effects on third
parties. Preventive intervention may have a general deterrent effect,
but its focus is on reducing a specific offender's propensity to commit
crime.
C. Objections Derived from Virtue Ethics
Hart was aware of the "imperfect" nature of the punishment
model as a deterrent; to him, a concern "more serious by far" than the
objection that a preventive regime might defeat deterrence was that it
"would undermine the foundation of a free society's effort to build up
each individual's sense of responsibility as a guide and a stimulus to
the constructive development of his capacity for effectual and fruitful
decision."97  This line of reasoning is consistent with virtue ethics
theory, which views punishment as a demand that each person
develop and exhibit good character traits, and thus is critical not only
of the prevention model but also of classical retributivists. 98
To use an example proffered by Kyron Huigens,99 a proponent of
virtue ethics would punish a person for rape even if the person
honestly thought, because of his drunkenness and the fact that the
victim's husband had told him she would be aroused by forcible
intercourse, that the protestations of the victim were feigned. A
96. ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 60 (1995) (noting that
deterrence theory "could justify [both] the punishment of an innocent person if that were certain
to deter several others [and] the imposition of a disproportionately harsh sentence on one
offender in order to deter several others from committing a similar offence").
97. Hart, supra note 83, at 410.
98. In addition to Huigens, whose work is described below, Dan Kahan's expressive theory
of punishment might fit in this category, although only tenuously so. See Kyron Huigens, The
Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 944 (2000) (arguing that
virtue ethics "picks up where Kahan's work leaves off').
99. The example appears in Huigens, The Dead End, supra note 98, at 968 n.116, as well as
in Kyron Huigens, Neitzsche and Aretaic Legal Theory, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 543, 569 n.27 (2003),
and Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1232 n.150 (2000)
[hereinafter Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase].
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retributivist interested in culpability might have trouble with this
position because of the lack of culpable intent.100 But Huigens also
considers relevant to the analysis the defendant's "severe voluntary
intoxication; his poor choice of friends; his ability to make himself
believe whatever he finds it convenient to believe and a general moral
obtuseness, as evidenced by his failure to perceive not only a woman's
genuine resistance to forced sexual intercourse, but also the fact that
even a simulated rape is an act degrading to human dignity."10 1 Such
a person should be punished both because he is at fault for having
"flawed and inadequate practical judgment" and because "the
justifying purpose of the criminal law is the inculcation of sound
practical judgment-a quality which is also known as virtue."'10 2
This latter point, which echoes Hart, greatly exaggerates the
importance of and need for the criminal law in shaping character.
Family, peers, schools, churches, and various other institutions are
likely to be much more effective at achieving that aim. 10 3 That is not
to say that the government should not attempt to inculcate sound
practical judgment in the public at large or in individuals who cause
harm. But a generic jury verdict is unlikely to get the message across
to the public. And telling the "rapist" his punishment is warranted
not only because of his conduct but because of his various character
traits seems like a relatively blunt instrument for changing the latter.
An individualized prevention regime, focused on the types of risk
factors that Huigens identifies, would be much better at developing
good judgment.
As to whether punishment is nonetheless mandated when a
person fails to develop a capacity for such judgment on his own, that
question threatens to plunge us into the middle of the
determinism/free will debate, which is taken up in Part IV. It will
suffice to say at this point that behavioral scientists who promote the
prevention model find difficult enough the retributivist claim that
100. See, e.g., 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 62(c)(2), at 253 & n.23
(listing and criticizing reasonable mistake provisions).
101. See Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, supra note 99, at 1231-32 n. 150.
102. Id. at 1237.
103. See, e.g., Robert Meir & Weldon Johnson, Deterrence as Social Control: The Legal and
Extralegal Production of Conformity, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 292, 302 (1977) ("[D]espite contemporary
predisposition toward the importance of legal sanction, our findings are ... consistent with the
accumulated literature concerning the primacy of interpersonal influence [over legal sanction].");
Raymond Paternoster & Lee Ann Iovanni, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity: A
Reexamination, 64 SOC. FORCES 751, 769 (1986) (reporting research suggesting that "the greatest
effects on delinquent involvement are those from informal forces of social control"); TYLER, supra
note 90, at 23-24 ("In focusing on peer group pressures [it has been shown] that law breaking is
strongly related to people's judgments about the sanctions or rewards their behavior elicits from
members of their social groups.").
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intentions are the principal causes of behavior (a recent symposium
issue of American Psychologist was entitled "Behavior-It's
Involuntary"10 4). They would find even more problematic assertions
that a person who commits crime is responsible, ex ante, for his moral
obtuseness or his acquaintances. Rather than condemn him for these
traits, it makes more sense to them, both from the crime prevention
and human dignity perspectives, to confront the morally bankrupt,
relationship-poor individual and help him structure his life in a more
satisfactory manner. 105 If antisocial behavior persists, then prolonged
incapacitation might be necessary, not as a matter of desert (which is
ambiguous at best) or in an effort to teach others (who either are not
listening or already know better), but as a preventive measure.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OBJECTIONS TO THE PREVENTIVE MODEL
This discussion leads to the major practical objection to the
prevention model: it simply is not feasible. We do not have the tools of
prediction, nor have we developed the methods of rehabilitation, to
implement an effective risk management system and, even if we did, it
would be far too expensive. These objections are plausible, but they
are not particularly persuasive when ranged against analogous
problems associated with the punishment model.
A. Inaccuracy and Its Consequences
Ever since the Supreme Court said it twenty-two years ago-
quoting the "leading" researcher on violence prediction, John
Monahan-the standard statement about our ability to predict
dangerousness is that at least two out of every three individuals the
experts label "dangerous" will not commit a violent act. 106 But within
a year of the Court's statement, Monahan himself had suggested that,
in light of new research using more sophisticated methodology,
predictions of dangerousness made by mental health professionals are
accurate closer to 50 percent of the time. 10 7 He has also noted that
104. See Denise Park, Acts of Will?, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 461 (1999) (summarizing four research
articles as suggesting "that we perceive ourselves to have far more control over our everyday
behavior than we actually do" and that "the source of behavioral control comes not from active
awareness but from subtle cues in the environment and from thought processes and information
not readily accessible to consciousness"); see also infra text accompanying notes 173-177.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
106. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900 n.7 (1983) (citing JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981)).
107. John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of
Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 11 (1984).
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any estimates of predictive accuracy are likely to be skewed downward
by the fact that the research on which they are based almost always
uses samples of people who are immediately institutionalized after a
positive prediction, thus making impossible observation of their
actions had they been left alone, which is the true test of the
prediction.108
In any event, prediction science has improved immensely since
1983. The MacArthur Research Network, of which Monahan is a
member, has done outstanding recent work on risk assessment. Using
"iterative classification trees" (akin to an actuarial flow chart), experts
can now identify groups of individuals with recidivism rates of 76
percent, 52 percent, and so on, down to a group that has a 1 percent
chance of recidivism.'0 9 The classifications depend on factors that are
relatively easily to calibrate, such as age, psychopathy (measured on a
highly reliable instrument), prior arrests, serious child abuse, alcohol
or drug use, violent fantasies, and legal status. 1 0 Developers of an
instrument called the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised can identify a
group that has a 77 percent chance of recidivism over a three-year
period."' Various other researchers claim that their predictive
methods are similarly accurate with a wide array of criminal
populations.11 2
Opponents of a preventive regime will note, however, that
these developments in prediction technology, as impressive as they
are, still do not allow us to prove future crimes beyond a reasonable
doubt or even by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the argument
goes, any regime that relies on prediction, at least when that
prediction results in incarceration, is illegitimate.13 There are several
responses to this oft repeated observation.
First, as I have developed in detail elsewhere, 1 4 many of the
punishment system's threshold determinations are at least as flawed
as the predictions that would need to be made in a preventive regime.
To begin with, as any criminal law expert knows, huge disagreement
108. Id.; see also Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97,
114-17 (1984) (recounting methodological problems with the studies).
109. JOHN MONAHAN, RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT ch. 5 (2001).
110. Id. at 100-101.
111. Marnie E. Rice et al., An Evaluation of a Maximum Security Therapeutic Community for
Psychopaths and Other Mentally Disordered Offenders, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 399, 406 (1992).
112. Slobogin, supra note 29, at 9-10 nn.32 & 35.
113. See, e.g., La Fond, supra note 25, at 698-99 (1992) (stating that permitting preventive
detention on a lesser showing transforms "the fundamental assumption of American criminal
justice that it 'is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free'.., into a
first principle worthy of George Orwell's 1984").
114. Slobogin, supra note 29, at 7-8.
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exists over the types of mentes reae that merit punishment, even for
serious crimes such as homicide. 115 Putting those unresolvable
conundrums aside, experience and research demonstrate that judicial
and jury conclusions about core culpability concepts such as
premeditation, recklessness, and insanity differ significantly across
individuals and across juries. 116 Given this unreliability, many of
these conclusions about blameworthiness cannot possibly achieve the
90 to 95 percent degree of accuracy normally associated with the
reasonable doubt standard. That should not be surprising, given the
ill-defined scope of legal mental states 117 and the difficulty of
investigating subjective beliefs and desires.118 But it is disturbing,
because these unreliable assessments can spell the difference between
a conviction for manslaughter and eligibility for the death penalty, or
between a prison term and indeterminate institutionalization in a
mental hospital.
For many crimes-say taking someone's purse, where the doing
of the act often permits confident assessments of mental state-
inaccuracy of this sort is generally not a problem. But even for these
types of crimes, arriving at a consensus on the appropriate sentence,
whether the metric is just deserts, deterrence, or practical reasoning
skills, is similarly impossible.11 9 As punishment for the crime of theft,
115. 3 JAMES FITZGERALD STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 94 (1883)
(arguing that sudden, "wanton" killing ought to be considered as culpable as killing committed
with "malice aforethought"); David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony
Murder Doctrine, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 359, 361-67 (1985) (describing arguments for and
against imposition of murder liability for accidental and negligent deaths caused during a
felony)". Debate flourishes in virtually every arena, however, not just with respect to homicide.
See, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 122-24 (2d ed. 1961) (describing retributive and
deterrence arguments for and against liability on negligence grounds); Robert Weisberg,
Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 236 (2000) ("For decades, the American
courts and legislatures have debated whether knowledge or 'true purpose' should be the
required mens rea for accomplice liability.").
116. Slobogin, supra note 29, at 7 n.21 (describing various studies showing significant
differences among individual views on culpability).
117. See Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code's Mens Rea Provisions Be
Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 204-05 (2003) (noting that even though the Model Penal
Code's mens rea provisions are "a dramatic improvement over prior law[,] courts have
encountered difficulty with numerous concepts [in the Code,] including mistake of law,
recklessness, willful blindness, and extreme indifference").
118. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a
Case Study, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 919, 927-31 (2000) (describing the difficulty of producing
scientific information about past mental states).
119. Ezzat A. Fattah, From Philosophical Abstraction to Restorative Action, From Senseless
Retribution to Meaningful Restitution: Just Deserts and Restorative Justice Revisited, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 308, 315 (Elmar G.M. Weitekamp & Hans-Jurgen
Kerner eds., 2002) ("It is possible to grade various criminal offences according to their objective
and/or perceived seriousness[, but] to come up with a prison term equivalent to theft or robbery,
to assault or rape, is inevitably arbitrary, capricious and despotic."); David Dolinko, Three
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for instance, on what basis can retributive, deterrent, or ethical theory
distinguish between a two-year sentence, as opposed to a two-month
sentence or any sentence in between? The vagaries in scientific
investigation that bedevil the risk management approach are trivial
compared to the calibration chores that afflict a retributivist regime
bent on ascertaining degree of culpability, a deterrence-based system
that purports to modulate the penalty based on cost-benefit analysis,
or a virtue ethics scheme that tries to measure fault for character. 120
Another type of inaccuracy associated with the punishment
model has to do with the form, rather than the length, of disposition.
Imprisonment, which is the most common type of punishment, is in a
deep sense not commensurate with blame; depriving someone of
virtually all of his freedom because he raped, robbed or assaulted
someone is a gigantic moral non sequitur. If we really are interested
in retributive punishment, the Biblical eye-for-an-eye shibboleth
comes much closer to getting it right, and if we really are interested
in repaying society or the victim then, as restorative justice advocates
argue, 121 reparation is more appropriate. Yet the first response is
rightly viewed with repugnance, and the second response, most desert
theorists would say, is insufficiently punitive. 22 The result is that
most dispositions under a desert-based punishment model bear only a
tenuous relationship to their rationale. 123
Risk management, on the other hand, is structured to achieve
the precise aims of the prevention model. Each intervention is
individualized, based on the need to deal with specific risk factors.
Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1640-41 (1992) (stating that most
retributivists are unconcerned about the possible unjustness of their culpability judgments and
that others who have tried to be more principled "fail to provide any method for determining the
amount of punishment that a particular crime or criminal deserves"); Katyal, supra note 89, at
2389 (noting "the complexity of the deterrence question" and stating that "a simple and elegant
answer to the deterrence question has not yet been found").
120. Michael H. Marcus, Comments on the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Preliminary Draft
No. 1, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 135, 146 n.44 (2003) ("It makes no sense to deride the [prediction
required by dangerous offender statutes] as imperfect when the default we defend is
overwhelmingly less informed, less careful, less analytical, and routinely productive of
astoundingly high recidivism rates.").
121. See, e.g., MARTIN WRIGHT, RESTORING RESPECT FOR JUSTICE chs.5-6 (1999).
122. Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95
MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2494 (1997) (noting that, given the value of liberty in our culture,
imprisonment unmistakably conveys society's denunciation of wrongdoers, while "[fines... are
a politically unacceptable alternative to imprisonment for expressive reasons: they seem to say
that society is pricing rather than condemning the wrongdoer's conduct").
123. Edward Rubin has recently made this point at length. Edward Rubin, Just Say No to
Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17, 28 (2004) ("[I]mprisonment bears very little relationship
to the concept of repayment .... [I]t seems odd to express symbolic disapproval [based on desert]
by locking the criminal away in an isolated institution.").
2005]
148 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1:121
Institutionalization makes perfect sense on this view (although, as
noted below, only if no other less restrictive intervention will prevent
the perceived harm 24). Restitution to and communicating with the
victim also is consistent with the prevention premise, at least to the
extent it helps the offender restructure his behavior by gaining an
understanding of the true harm caused by his act. 125
A third response to the inaccuracy point is that the cost of a
mistake in a risk management regime is likely to be much lower than
the cost of a mistake under the punishment model. Under the latter
model, once culpability is assessed, the fix is in; the degree of blame
determines the type and the length, or at least the range, of liberty
deprivation. Under a prevention regime, in contrast, risk is constantly
monitored and, if considered low enough, release occurs; such periodic
review is probably constitutionally required. 126 Furthermore, as just
noted, the dispositional emphasis is on community-based programs,
which are a viable alternative even for some violent offenders. 127
Indeed, community dispositions are both legally and pragmatically
necessary to a preventive regime. As a constitutional matter, the
degree of liberty deprivation should be limited to that necessary to
124. See infra text accompanying notes 127-132.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
126. See Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (suggesting that a
hearing is required when dangerousness is relevant under the pertinent statute); Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1997) (noting that Kansas law required periodic review).
127. Consider this assessment by the authors of several studies that look closely at the risk
assessment and risk management challenges posed by dangerous offenders:
Almost all of the treatments suggested for use with offenders and mentally disordered
offenders could be provided in the community. In fact, some of the treatments (e.g.,
social skills training, life skills training, relapse prevention programs) actually might
be more successful in a community setting. With the exception of high scorers on
Management Problems and Aggression (toward self as well as others) and Active
Psychotic Symptoms scales,... it is difficult to argue that institutionalization is
necessary, or even desirable, for treatment. Rather, in most cases the only reason for
institutionalization is to protect the public....
For the highest risk offenders... permanent institutionalization should be
implemented. For low-risk individuals, treatment for criminogenic needs could be
provided under modest supervision in the community. For higher risk clients,
treatment for criminogenic factors could occur within the institution, or at least begin
in the institution, and continue under aggressive community supervision.
Noncriminogenic factors for these persons could be treated entirely in the community.
VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 214 (1998).
Research also suggests that imprisonment is criminogenic. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan et al., Be
Careful What You Wish For: The Comparative Impacts of Juvenile versus Criminal Court
Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders (Columbia Law School, Working
Paper No. 03-61, 2003) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.rfm? abstract id=491202
(reporting a study finding that prosecution of broad classes of juveniles as adults and
nonindividualized harsh treatment of juveniles in juvenile court increases recidivism and is
"ineffective at specific deterrence of serious crime").
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achieve the government's prevention aims. 128 As a practical matter, it
is almost impossible to predict or change behavior in the community
when a person is sitting in a prison. 129
Those familiar with the sexual predator programs-which
routinely incarcerate and rarely release130-may be skeptical of these
latter claims. But, as their postsentence focus indicates, the sexual
predator programs of today are really appendages of a punishment
regime, not a bona fide implementation of the prevention model.
Under the old sex psychopath programs of the mid-twentieth century,
which operated in lieu of a sentence, release and conditional release
were quite common. 131 The better illustration of the risk management
approach is the drug court, which uses incarceration as a last resort.
As Professors Dorf and Sabel note, these courts are truly
"experimentalist," in the sense that they constantly modify
dispositions to maximize behavior change in the offender. 132  In
contrast to a punishment model, where the concept of experimentation
is incoherent (since the crime definitively establishes the sanction
received), the flexible nature of a risk management makes
confinement just one of many options, relied upon only when
necessary to achieve specific deterrence or prevent harm. Further
128. Several commentators have further developed this argument. See Eric S. Janus &
Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent
Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 358-59 (2003); Christopher Slobogin et al., A Prevention Model
of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 185, 212-
13; see also United States v. Juvenile, 347 F.3d 778, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
requirement that juveniles be sentenced to the least restrictive environment "is implicit in the
structure and purpose of the [Juvenile Delinquency Act,]" which focuses on rehabilitation).
129. See supra note 127.
130. See Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional
Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 204-06 (1996) (indicating that only
six sex offenders were released from secure confinement under Minnesota's program since 1975).
131. Eric S. Janus, Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an Empirically-
Based Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083, 1088 (2003) (noting
that Minnesota's sex psychopath law, passed in the late 1930s, "was initially used extensively for
relatively brief institutionalization of low-level sexual offenders"); Lawrence T. Burick, An
Analysis of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SCI. 254, 261 n.73 (1968) (discussing release data from sex psychopath programs from 1938 to
1952 indicating that up to 50 percent were released within a relatively short time frame). Even
these programs, however, were not really prevention-oriented. See Estelle B. Freedman,
"Uncontrolled Desires": The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-60, 74 J. AM. HIST. 83, 94-
98 (1987) (explaining that the psychopath programs were legislative reactions to a perceived sex
crime problem).
132. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 834, 839 (2000) ("[D]rug courts are able to
determine which programs can effectively monitor the progress of individual clients, and which
clients are able to take advantage of capable programs [by mandating] that service providers
continually inform the court about the progress (or lack thereof) of each client [and] monitoring
the treatment providers themselves.").
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protection against indeterminate confinement can be guaranteed if, as
I have argued, government's authority to prolong incapacitation is
conditioned on increasingly more convincing showings of serious
danger. 133 This requirement would place practical limitations on the
duration of liberty deprivation for all offenders, and especially for
petty and relatively low-risk criminals.
More will be said about model risk management programs
below. For now, the important points are that, compared to a
punishment regime, mistakes under such a program are probably no
more likely, and in any event visit less deprivation of liberty and are
more easily corrected.
B. Efficacy Issues
A second major source of discomfort about a preventive regime
stems from the belief that, no matter how much verbal allegiance we
give to the least drastic penalty notion, the default disposition will be
long-term confinement, given our ignorance about how to manage risk
in any other way. Although it was written over twenty years ago as a
review of rehabilitative efforts up to that time, Francis Allen's book,
The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, is still one of the best
statements of this view. First, Allen noted, efforts at establishing
reformation-oriented systems "have tended to inflict larger
deprivations of liberty and volition on its subjects than is sometimes
exacted from prisoners in more overtly punitive programs" and have
ended up looking little different than the prison regimes they sought
to replace. 134  Second, these systems have usually given release
decisionmaking authority to nonlegally trained parole boards and
mental health professionals with no clear criteria for release or
accountability, leading to unequal treatment, demoralization and
cynicism among offenders. 135 Third, in Allen's straightforward words,
"we do not know how to prevent criminal recidivism through
rehabilitative effort. 136  That these are not simply historical
133. Slobogin, supra note 29, at 50-53 (arguing that a proportionality principle, which ties
the duration of preventive detention to the degree of dangerousness, should apply to all
government interventions based on dangerousness). I also proposed adoption of a consistency
principle, which mandates that the degree of danger required to criminalize inchoate and
anticipatory conduct be consonant with the degree of danger required for commitment (i.e., clear
and convincing evidence), a position that could lead to a significant degree of decriminalization.
Id. at 53-62.
134. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE 49-50 (1981).
135. Id. at 52, 72-73.
136. Id. at 57.
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observations is borne out by the current experience with sexual
predator statutes which, as just noted, routinely result in long-term
institutionalization, often with little or no treatment and subject only
to periodic review based on vague standards.
The experience with sexual predator laws, however, should not
obscure the fact that risk management techniques, like risk
assessment methods, have improved immensely over the past few
decades. 137 In general, researchers have found that programs based
on fear, punishment, or psychotherapy-the bread and butter of older
rehabilitation programs-are much less likely to reduce recidivism
than programs "that are highly structured and behavioral or
cognitive-behavioral, that are run in the community rather than an
institution, that are run with integrity and enthusiasm, that target
higher-risk rather than lower-risk offenders, and that are intensive in
terms of number of hours and overall length of program."138  For
instance, "multisystemic therapy," which involves intense family,
school, and peer-based interventions over a four-month period, can
reduce recidivism among violent juveniles by as much as 75%
compared to matched control groups that receive no treatment or
traditional treatment in prisons. 139  The same type of intensive,
ecological treatment works well with many adult offenders. 140 Thus,
drug treatment courts that closely monitor the offender's performance
in the program, as well as the program itself, typically cut drug use-
137. See Don A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant
and Psychologically Informed Meta-analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 388 (1990) (conducting a
meta-analysis on studies of treatment and recidivism rates and concluding that appropriate
treatment methods do reduce recidivism); see Santiago Redondo et al., The Influence of
Treatment Programmes on the Recidivism of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: An European Meta-
Analytic Review, 5 PSYCHOL. CRIME & LAW 251, 252 (1999).
138. Grant T. Harris & Marnie E. Rice, Mentally Disordered Offenders: What Research Says
about Effective Service, in IMPULSIVITY: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT 361, 374
(Christopher D. Webster & Margaret A. Jackson eds., 1997); see also Don A. Andrews, The
Psychology of Criminal Conduct and Effective Treatment, in WHAT WORKS: REDUCING
REOFFENDING 35, 38-41 (James McGuire ed., 1995) (asserting that a review of criminal justice
research suggests that punitive programs are less effective in reducing recidivism than
treatment programs and that "effective correctional treatment involves attention to individual
differences in risk, need and responsivity and to the use of professional discretion.").
139. Charles M. Borduin et al., Multisystemic Treatment of Serious Juvenile Offenders: Long-
Term Prevention of Criminality and Violence, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 569, 573
(1995) (reporting a recidivism rate of 22.1 percent for adolescents participating in MST,
compared to a rate of 71.4 percent for those who completed individual treatment and 87.5
percent for those who refused treatment altogether).
140. Paul Gendreau et al., Intensive Rehabilitation Supervision: The Next Generation in
Community Corrections?, in CONTEMPORARY CORRECTIONS: PROBATION, PAROLE, AND
INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 198, 201-04 (Joan Petersilia ed., 1998).
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related recidivism in half.141  Even treatment of child molesters
modeled on these principles can work, although not as dramatically.
Research conducted in the past ten years indicates that cognitive
therapy may reduce their recidivism rates by up to 25 percent.142
Among all offenders involved in rehabilitation programs that meet the
above criteria, the average reduction in recidivism is between 20 and
40 percent.1 43
In short, the sentencing reform mantra of the seventies and
eighties that "nothing works" is not true.1 44 Indeed, the author of the
meta-review from which that famous phrase derives disavowed it
within five years of its publication. 145 These findings significantly
undermine one of the primary motivations behind policymakers'
rejection of a reform-oriented system.
The preventive model of justice may also be relatively effective
at encouraging law-abiding behavior in those who are not the subject
of government intervention. This is not an argument from classical
deterrence, which earlier discussion suggested is a weak justification
for such intervention. Rather it is based on social influence theory,
which claims that people tend to behave consistently with their
surroundings. 146 One might think that removing criminals from the
141. See Daren Banks & Denise C. Gottfredson, The Effects of Drug Treatment and
Supervision on Time to Rearrest Among Drug Treatment Court Participants, 33 J. DRUG ISSUES
385, 397 (2003) (finding 40 percent recidivism rate among drug court offenders and 80 percent
rate among control group); Daniel T. Eisman, Drug Courts: Changing People's Lives, ADVOCATE,
Sept. 2003, at 16, 17-18 (finding a reduction from 42 percent to 18 percent for drug-related
offenses and from 63 percent to 38 percent for all offenses); see also Eric Blumenson, Recovering
from Drugs and the Drug War: An Achievable Public Health Alternative, 6 J. GENDER, RACE &
JUST. 225, 235 (2002) (describing studies of drug treatment programs that "reported a dramatic
decrease in criminal activity among participants").
142. LeRoy L. Kondo, The Tangled Web-Complexities, Fallacies and Misconceptions
Regarding the Decision to Release Treated Sexual Offenders From Civil Commitment to Society,
23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 195, 199 (2003) (citing M. Alexander, Sex Offender Treatment: Does It
Work?, NOTA-ATSA First Joint Int'l Conf. (Sept. 1995)) (finding a 10 percent recidivism
difference-14.4 percent v. 25.8 percent-between treated and untreated child molesters); W.L.
Marshall & H.E. Barbaree, The Long-Term Evaluation of a Behavioral Treatment Program for
Child Molesters, 26 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 499, 508 (1988) (finding a 25 percent difference-32
percent v. 57 percent-in recidivism between treated and untreated sex offenders).
143. Mark W. Lipsey & David B. Wilson, The Efficacy of Psychological, Educational, and
Behavioral Treatment, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1181 (1993).
144. The phrase derives from Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers
About Prison Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 25, in which Martinson concluded, "With few
and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no
appreciable effect on recidivism." The article had an "immediate and widespread impact."
ALLEN, supra note 134, at 57.
145. Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing
Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 254 (1979).
146. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 350, 351-61 (1997):
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community, the usual result of punishment, would be the best method
of stemming negative social influence. But there is good reason to
believe that the modern criminal justice system's reaction to crime
may actually increase influences toward antisocial behavior, by
causing resentment toward authority, unwillingness to cooperate with
law enforcement, and the dismantlement of families and other
institutions that act as a break on crime.
This is the argument of Darryl Brown, who contrasts the
current punitive approach to street crime with our predominantly
preventive approach toward white collar, and in particular corporate,
crime.147  Brown notes that, rather than routinely resorting to
imprisonment, prosecutors working white collar cases often rely on
"civil" remedies such as restitution, enforcement of compliance
programs, and other attempts to restructure the corporate culture. 48
In doing so, they implicitly recognize the force of social influence on
would-be wrongdoers, as well as the unnecessary damage a punitive
approach would wreak on employees and shareholders. Brown
contends that the government's response to street crime could follow
the same "preventive, compliance-oriented" path it takes with respect
to corporate crime: "It could take advantage of, rather than ignore and
contradict, knowledge about social influence: it could more fully assess
and minimize the social costs of punishment."1 49 His examples of how
this social influence approach would work are the same types of risk
management programs described above-drug treatment courts,
victim-offender mediation, and "survivor-centered" domestic violence
policies-which together target "a broad slice of the criminal justice
system," including drug offenders, property offenses among neighbors,
and violence among intimates. 150 Brown's work suggests that an
[I] ndividuals are much more likely to commit crimes when they perceive that criminal
activity is widespread [because] they are likely to infer that the risk of being caught
for a crime is low[,] conclude that relatively little stigma or reputational cost attaches
to being a criminal[, and] view such activity as status enhancing. [They also] are less
likely to form moral aversions to criminality.
147. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 passim (2001).
148. Id. at 1311-16. Treatment of corporate criminality is to be distinguished from
treatment of individual corporate criminals which, consistent with the general trends in
backward-looking criminal jurisprudence, have become increasingly-and many would argue
irrationally-punitive, at least at the federal level. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager
les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendment that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. LAW 373, 419-26 (2004) (discussing the inconsistency in increasing federal corporate crime
penalties when the frequency of such crimes has decreased and the average sentences of white
collar criminals has increased).
149. Id. at 1345.
150. Id. at 1351-57.
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individual-centered preventive system has a better cost-benefit ratio
than a punitive one even when crime-related costs and benefits are
defined broadly, to include interests beyond those associated with
reducing the recidivism of the individual criminal. 151
Risk management programs probably cannot eliminate the
abuses of discretion, the disparity in dispositions, and the
demoralization effects that Francis Allen rightly associates with the
rehabilitative agenda. But, again, comparison with the punishment
model suggests that a modern preventive regime might well be an
improvement on all three counts.
Abuse of discretion occurs in any system. In a preventive
regime it is most likely to occur during disposition, while under the
punishment model it occurs during the charging stage. Given the
discretion granted prosecutors, the latter process can produce wildly
irrational results, whether viewed from a desert or a deterrence
perspective. 52  It is also notoriously difficult to monitor. 153  In
contrast, risk management decisions are much more transparent, not
only because a public hearing is held periodically, but because risk
assessment usually will be based on statistically-derived factors that
result from peer-reviewed research (and therefore can more easily
police for use of illegitimate factors such as race).
As to disparity, that is in the eye of the beholder. To some,
treating all armed robbers alike makes sense. 154 But, in fact, the
"desert" visited by a particular term of imprisonment varies from
robber to robber, depending on the conditions of imprisonment and the
151. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV.
323 (2004) (arguing that a true assessment of the costs of the punitive approach might lead to
adoption of more "problem-solving" and "community" courts).
152. Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358-62 (1978) (upholding mandatory life
sentence imposed on an offender who was prosecuted as an habitual offender after turning down
a plea offer pursuant to which the prosecutor would have recommended a five-year sentence);
Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 47, 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing and remanding for a new
trial on other grounds a life sentence imposed on twelve year-old prosecuted as an adult after he
turned down a plea offer of three years in juvenile detention and ten years probation).
153. See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Prosecution: Prosecutorial Discretion, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME & JUSTICE 1272, 1275 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) ("[Tlhe American prosecutor has
complete discretion with respect to the selection of the charge."); see also Anthony V. Alfieri,
Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1204-05 (1999) ("Attributable in part to the dynamics of
the adversarial system, prosecutorial discretion may rapidly breach the restraints and
responsibilities of ethics rules."); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence,
Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 413 (2001) ("Despite the ABA standards,
prosecutors frequently charge more and greater offenses than they can prove beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
154. The classic statements on this score come from ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE:
THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 49-55 (1976) (rejecting the rehabilitative ideal as unworkable and
unjust and concluding that the length of an offender's sentence should reflect the seriousness of
the offender's crime).
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nature of the offender. 15 5 Thus, a system that stresses consistency of
treatment for those who represent similar risks may be more
equitable. The intense judicial resistance to the desert-based federal
sentencing guidelines seems to indicate that many judges favor the
latter form of equality. 156
Risk management approaches are most susceptible to the
demoralization claim when they require indeterminate, potentially
lifelong confinement to be effective at prevention (and there certainly
would be such cases). 57 But here too the claim can be exaggerated.
Offenders subjected to this type of confinement, although not always
told a time certain when they will cease to be a managee, are given
specific goals they must achieve (such as completion of vocational
programs or satisfactory behavioral control during a conditional
release). 158  Compared to waiting out a period which bears no
necessary relationship to their ability to function in a law-abiding
manner, that approach may be psychologically less demanding. It is
also more likely to enhance individual responsibility; time of release in
a preventive regime is to a significant extent controlled by the
offender, which should not only enhance rehabilitative success, but
also energize those with the potential to be law-abiding. 59
155. Consider these remarks:
It is neither fair nor equitable to give those found guilty of identical or similar crimes
identical prison sentences. The same prison term does not entail the same amount of
pain and suffering, does not involve identical deprivations, and does not carry with it
the same consequences to different offenders. The pains and consequences of
imprisonment are far different even when offenders are kept in the same institution,
in similar conditions, for the same length of time.
Fattah, supra note 119, at 316; see also Michael Marcus, Archaic Sentencing Liturgy Sacrifices
Public Safety: What's Wrong and How We Can Fix It, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 76, 81 n. 7 (2003)
(consistency "is largely accomplished only by adamant refusal to acknowledge differences so that
we can claim that we are treating like offenders alike").
156. Michael Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the U.S. Sentencing Commission's
"Mandatory Guidelines," 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 129, 132 & 133 n.12 (1991) (citing the Report
of the Federal Courts Study Committee 23, 37-38 (1990), that describes a survey finding that a
common complaint of district court judges about the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was the
elimination of judicial discretion).
157. Plattner, supra note 41, at 110 (describing Jessica Mitford's book, Kind and Usual
Punishment, as having as a "constant refrain.., the hatred felt by prisoners for the
indeterminate-sentencing system, which they feel forces them to play a 'treatment game' they do
not believe in, subjects their lives to the arbitrary whims of correctional authorities, and
produces unjustifiable disparities in the amount of time served for similar crimes").
158. For instance, "staged" treatment is an well-accepted modality even for sex offenders.
See, e.g., W.L. Marshall et al., A Three-Tiered Approach to the Rehabilitation of Incarcerated Sex
Offenders, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 441 (1993) (desc'ibing programs during a six-month confinement
in a maximum security institution which, if successfully completed, are followed by several
months in a minimum security facility, followed by outpatient monitoring).
159. Research suggests that setting an achievable treatment goal, one agreed upon by the
offender, may be indispensable to change and fosters motivation and effective functioning.
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C. Costs
A third pragmatic objection to preventive regimes is their fiscal
impact. As Francis Allen put it, advocates of penal reform have often
displayed "a splendid disregard for the fact of scarce resources."'160
Again, the sexual predator experience suggests Allen's observation is
still true today. The state of Illinois estimated that initiation of a sex
offender program in that state would cost one billion dollars over ten
years.161
Again, however, the modern sexual predator program is the
wrong paradigm for many types of offenders. Multisystemic therapy,
described above, costs $29,000 less per juvenile than boot camp, and
far less still than traditional detention.1 62 Drug court dispositions are
significantly less expensive than prison terms for small-time drug
dealers and addicts. 6 3 For many other types of offenders, halfway
houses, day programs, furloughs and other types of community
arrangements are cheaper than more secure dispositions, as well as
more effective at reducing recidivism. 164
None of this should suggest that a preventive regime would be
inexpensive. Secure confinement would need to be maintained as an
option at the same time more intermediate and community programs
would need to be developed. But it should also be recognized that,
under a preventive regime that is focused on prevention rather than
punishment or deterrence, the demand for secure confinement would
be reduced. Selective incapacitation, which is the focus of
individualized risk management, will always be less costly than the
ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION 338, 467-79 (1986); EDWARD
L. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 208-10 (1980).
160. ALLEN, supra note 134, at 54-55.
161. John Q. La Fond, The Costs of Enacting A Sexual Predator Law, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY
468, 500 (1998).
162. See Slobogin et al., supra note 128, at 224 n. 122 (citing study); see also STEVE AOS ET
AL., THE COMPARATIVE COSTS AND BENEFITS TO REDUCE CRIME: A REVIEW OF NATIONAL
RESEARCH FINDINGS (1999) (indicating that cost of multisystemic therapy ('MST') was one-fifth
that of institutionalization, and estimating costs savings of $30,000 to $131,000 per juvenile
based on prevention of subsequent incidents, or $8.38 for every dollar spent on MST).
163. See, e.g., JEFF TAUBER & C. WEST HUDDLESTON, RENTRY DRUG COURTS: CLOSING THE
GAP 19 (1999) (reporting an Oregon study estimating over ten million dollars in savings, or ten
dollars saved for every one dollar spent on drug court); Blumenson, supra note 141, at 237-238
(recounting studies finding that drug treatment programs are at least seven times more cost-
effective than law enforcement strategies).
164. Kristin Parsons Winokur et al., What Works in Juvenile Justice Outcome Measurement-
A Comparison of Predicted Success to Observed Performance, 66 FED. PROBATION 50, 53 (2002)
(using a sophisticated methodology to evaluate range of treatment programs and finding that
"community-based approach offers not only the greatest effectiveness when controlling for
youths' individual risk factors, but also does it at minimal cost.").
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general incapacitation that results from the punishment model's focus
on culpability. The most conspicuous example of general
incapacitation-the "three strikes and you're out" statutes-is a serious
burden on the fiscal integrity of many state correctional systems. 165
Yet if proof of past crime is the gravamen of intervention, three-
strikes laws are an unsurprising, if not inevitable, reaction to rising
crime rates. A preventive regime, on the other hand, can limit costly
confinement to those with three strikes (or two or four) who are the
most dangerous. 166
When one expands the notion of cost to include the harm to
others incurred as a result of preventable crime, and the need to
prosecute it, the prevention regime should do even better by
comparison to the current system, for reasons already suggested. The
sole goal of a preventive regime is to reduce crime. By definition, that
is not the only goal of a regime based on just deserts.
IV. THE IMPENDING LESSONS OF SCIENCE
To this point, this Article has proceeded largely by defending
the preventive model against criticisms that have been leveled at it.
Along the way, however, it has noted several positive aspects of the
model, including its treatment of the offender as an individual worthy
of respect, its potential for self-correction, and its efficacy at crime
reduction. At least one other benefit of a preventive regime deserves
special attention: the ease with which it can assimilate new scientific
discoveries about human behavior. This capacity may be its single
most important advantage in achieving criminal "justice."
A. The Implications of Hard Determinism
The increasing accuracy of prediction based on demographic
and situational factors, described earlier, 167 is one of many pieces of
165. See Nkechi Taifa, 'Three-Strikes-And- You're-Out"-Mandatory Life Imprisonment for
Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717, 722 (1995) (describing costs).
166. For instance, roughly 5-8 percent of chronic offenders commit over 50 percent of juvenile
crime. DAVID P. FARRINGTON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING CRIME 50-51 (1986);
MICHAEL SCHUMACHER & GWEN A. KURZ, THE 8% SOLUTION: PREVENTING SERIOUS, REPEAT
JUVENILE CRIME 4-5 (2001) (reporting a study finding that 8 percent of juvenile offenders
committed 55 percent of repeat offenses, and that over half of these offenders continued crime as
an adult); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION 97 (1995)
(making the point in the text, although concluding that we do not have the ability to identify
"persistent high-rate offenders," a conclusion contested in this Article).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 109-112.
2005]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
evidence that behavioral scientists rely on in arguing that all human
behavior is determined by biology, upbringing, and the current
environment. There is a significant amount of evidence more directly
supporting this proposition. Very briefly described here, it suggests
that our actions are wholly caused by factors over which we have no
control (hard determinism), or at least that we are strongly
predisposed to act in certain ways (soft determinism).
A number of studies indicate that genes, organic processes, and
early childhood experiences play a very influential role in criminal
behavior. Research on animals has found that the presence or absence
of particular genes and hormones has a significant impact on levels of
aggression. 168 Twin and adoption studies point to heredity as a major
determinant in the development of criminal behavior, which
environmental factors can exacerbate. 16 9 Low serotonin levels and
variations in dopamine receptors have been associated with increased
aggressive and impulsive behavior. 170 When the chemical imbalance
is combined with abuse as a child, antisocial behavior is even more
likely.171 Although no particular gene or biological trait is going to
explain violent or other antisocial behavior, some scientists believe
that a mixture of such factors, triggered by environmental stimuli,
may well do so.' 7 2
168. See, e.g., Randy J. Nelson et al., Behavioral Abnormalities in Male Mice Lacking
Neuronal Nitric Oxide Synthase, 378 NATURE 383, 385-86 (1995); Fr6d6ric Saudou et al.,
Enhanced Aggressive Behavior in Mice Lacking 5-HT1b Receptor, 265 SCI. 1875, 1876-78 (1994).
169. Hill Goldsmith & Irving I. Gottesman, Heritable Variability and Variable Heritability in
Developmental Psychopathology, in FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 5 (Mark
F. Lenzenweger & Jeffrey J. Haugaard eds., 1996) (reviewing twin studies suggesting that adult
criminal behaviors are moderately heritable and only slightly influenced by environmental
factors); Remi J. Cadoret et al., Genetic-Environmental Interaction in the Genesis of Aggressivity
and Conduct Disorders, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 916, 919-24 (1995) (finding that adoptees
who have a genetic predisposition toward criminal activity exhibit high aggression, and are even
more aggressive if reared by a parent with substance abuse and legal problems, but are not
abnormally aggressive if there is no genetic predisposition, whether or not reared in an adverse
home environment).
170. See generally Evan Balaban et al., Mean Genes and the Biology of Human Aggression: A
Critical Review of Recent Animal and Human Research, 11 J. NEUROGENETICS 1 (1996) (noting
that over fifty studies have shown a relationship between serotonin and antisocial behavior, but
criticizing their methodology and conclusions); Peter McGuffin & Anita Thapar, Genetics and
Antisocial Personality Disorder, in PSYCHOPATHY: ANTISOCIAL, CRIMINAL AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
215 (Theodore Millon et al. eds., 1998) (providing a synopsis of the literature showing a link
between genetics and personality disorders).
171. Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children,
297 SCI. 851, 853 (2002) (finding that 85 percent of sample with low MAOA neurotransmitter
levels and who were abused as children developed some sort of antisocial behavior). Also of
interest is research correlating psychopathy with abnormal neurological symptoms. See
generally BARTOL, supra note 53, at 92-105 (summarizing EEG research on psychopathy).
172. See, e.g., Katherine I. Morley & Wayne D. Hall, Is There a Genetic Susceptibility to
Engage in Criminal Acts?, TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME & CRIM. JUST., Oct. 2003, at 5 (arguing
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Social and cognitive psychology research has also produced
insights into the linkage (or lack thereof) between thought process and
behavior. Unconscious, automatic processes dominate human
cognition, from the initial perception of events to responses to them 7a
(which is not surprising, given the degree of reflexive behavior in
animals). More specifically, phenomena such as personality type,
heuristic ways of thinking, and neural pathways that develop in
response to external stimuli determine the information or events we
notice and the way we interpret them. 174 Moreover, we frequently are
unaware of these bases for judgment, 175 and often are wrong in our
explanation for our choices and behaviors. 176 Research also suggests
that the "reasons" for a particular action may well follow, rather than
precede, the unconscious processes that produce the behavior, and
sometimes may even follow the action itself, acting as an unconscious
rationalization of it.177 In other words, our intentions and motivations
are not only often caused by processes of which we are not aware but
may not even be the direct impetus for our actions.
that "it is much more likely that a large number of genetic variants will be identified that, in the
presence of the necessary environmental factors, will increase the likelihood that some
individuals develop behavioural traits that will make them more likely to engage in criminal
activities.").
173. See generally John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of
Being, 54 AM. PSYCH. 462 (1999) (questioning the common assumption among psychological
researchers that people control their lives largely through conscious means and arguing that
various forms of nonconscious systems do most of that work); Irving Kirsch & Steven J. Lynn,
Automaticity in Clinical Psychology, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 504 (1999) (reviewing research on
particular automatic processes, areas of behavior they affect, and psychotherapeutic approaches
to them).
174. On the effect of personality on information processing, see Brendan P. Bradley et al.,
Selective Processing of Negative Information: Effects of Clinical Anxiety, Concurrent Depression,
and Awareness, 104 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 532, 535-36 (1995), and Karin Mogg et al.,
Subliminal Processing of Emotional Information in Anxiety and Depression, 102 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHIATRY 304, 309-310 (1993). On the development of neural pathways that control access to
emotional stimuli, see generally JOSEPH E. LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS
UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE (1996). On the effects of heuristic thinking, see Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582, 589
(1996) (responding to suggestions that heuristic thinking usually results in accurate judgments).
175. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1125 (1974) (describing the unconscious nature of heuristic thinking).
176. See generally Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We
Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977) (reviewing studies
finding that people are frequently wrong about their explanations for choices and behaviors, even
when confident about them).
177. See, e.g., Jutta Keller & Heidi Heckhausen, Readiness Potentials Preceding
Spontaneous Motor Acts: Voluntary vs. Involuntary Control, 76 ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY &
CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 351, 360 (1990) ("[Olur results suggest that the ... time of feeling
an urge to move necessarily coincides with the change of control from a lateral unconscious to a
medial conscious.").
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As many have pointed out,178 if the full implications of this
research turn out to be true of human behavior, the premises of a
desert or general-deterrence model of government intervention become
much more tenuous, if not unsupportable. If our acts result from
phenomena over which we have no control, the claim that we
"deserve" to be punished for our antisocial conduct or can be deterred
from it by general proscriptions of conduct becomes more difficult to
sustain, even if the conduct is "intentional." Compatibilists (those who
think that the free will paradigm and determinism can be reconciled)
argue that, even if determinism is true, people can still justifiably be
held responsible for actions that are caused by intact practical
reasoning. 179 But, without regurgitating the full debate or trying to
resolve the ultimate issue, it is easy to see why many have concluded
their logic is faulty. Even assuming that reasons do cause behavior,
determinism (which compatibilists accept arguendo) dictates that
reasons are determined as well. Nor can we easily say, as virtue
ethics theorists posit,180 that we are responsible for our character, if
the way we perceive and respond to the world depends on our
character. In addition to this serious chicken-and-egg conundrum,
these theorists have to deal with the extensive research literature
indicating that most character formation occurs in the developmental
years leading up to age fourteen, when the person can hardly be held
responsible for how he or she turns out.181
178. See, e.g., Richard Lowell Nygaard, Freewill, Determinism, Penology and the Human
Genome: Where's A New Leibniz When We Really Need Him?, 3 U. CHI. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 417,
421-22, 430 (1996) (arguing that if genes are definitively linked to violent behavior "[w]e must
prepare ourselves for the 'real shock' of where this ... leads .... to new fundamental scientific,
social, civil, and criminal laws."); Steven I. Friedland, The Criminal Law Implications of the
Human Genome Project: Reimagining a Genetically Oriented Criminal Justice System, 86 KY.
L.J. 303, 308-09 (1998) ("This shift in paradigm from free will to some form of determinism-
either a 'weak' determinism, in which genes play only a factor in behavior, or a 'strong
determinism, in which genes are a causal agent of behavior-would create pressure to reinvent
the current understanding of criminal responsibility.").
179. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock & Allen E. Buchanan, The Genetics of Behavior and Concepts of
Free Will and Determinism, in GENETICS AND CRIMINALITY 67, 67-75 (Jeffrey R. Botkin et al.
eds., 1999) (discussing the compatibilist and incompatibilist forms of determinism in light of the
Human Genome Project); Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE
AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 157, 177-81 (Brent Garland ed., 2004).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
181. This is a well-documented aspect of human development. See, e.g., JEAN PIAGET, THE
MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 95-103 (Marjorie Gabain trans., 1965); LAWRENCE KOHLBERG,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 323-44
(1981) (arguing, based on research, that ideas of moral obligation originate in early childhood but
evolve as youths mature into adulthood). As to the development of a "criminal" character, see
Terrie E. Moffit, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A
Development Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 679 (1993) (describing life-course-persistent
offenders who "exhibit changing manifestations of antisocial behavior: biting and hitting at age
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B. The Implications of Soft Determinism
The determinist hypothesis has not yet been proven, and it
may never be; certainly, many of us intuitively reject it, based on our
daily experience, and the academic debate has, to date, resulted in a
stalemate. 182 But one does not have to subscribe to hard determinism
to recognize that discoveries about the causes of antisocial conduct can
(and should) create substantial stress within the criminal justice
system. Serious arguments have been made in favor of defenses based
on chromosomal abnormalities, psychopathy, rotten social
background, cultural differences, black rage, TV "intoxication,"
battered women syndrome, and a host of other genetic and situational
phenomena, a list ultimately limited only by the imagination. 183 Some
of these defenses are based on very weak empirical evidence, but all
have some logic and science to them. 184 At the least, these various
assertions suggest that many people who commit crime find avoiding
it very difficult.
four, shoplifting and truancy at age ten, selling drugs and stealing cars at age sixteen, robbery
and rape at age twenty-two, and fraud and child abuse at age thirty"). For a discussion (by a
retributivist) of the moral arbitrariness inherent in the molding influences of both nature and
nurture, see Wojciech Sadurski, Natural and Social Lottery, and Concepts of the Self, 9 LAW &
PHIL. 157, 160-79 (1990).
182. Compare HILARY BOK, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 3-9 (1998) (compatibilist account)
and JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 161-69 (1998) (same), with DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE
WILL 127-57 (2001) (hard determinist account) and SAUL SMILANSKY, FREE WILL AND ILLUSION
94-105 (2000) (same).
183. For arguments on behalf of these types of claims, see David Skeen, The Genetically
Defective Offender, 9 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 217, 245-63 (1983) (chromosomal defects); Peter
Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and
Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1608-1622 (1992) (psychopathy); Richard Delgado,
"Rotten Social Background" Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe
Environmental Deprivation? 3 L. & INEQUALITY 9, 12-23 (1985); Alison D. Renteln, A
Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437,
445-85 (1993) (cultural differences); Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based
Upon the Toxicity of the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black
Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731, 783-801 (1996); Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and
Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321, 323-30 (1992); David L. Bazelon, The
Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976) (poverty); Jennifer L. Grossman,
Postpartum Psychosis-A Defense to Criminal Responsibility or Just Another Gimmick?, 67 U.
DET. L. REV. 311, 313 (1990').
184. See supra note 183. For a description of the scientific basis of a number of other
defenses of this sort (including epilepsy, hypoglycemic syndrome, dissociative states,
posttraumatic stress disorder, and genetic aberrations), see GARY P. MELTON ET AL.,
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 218-225 (2d ed. 1997).
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A system based on desert ought to take this fact into account, 185
but our current criminal justice system, perhaps due to fear of
psychiatric minefields or perhaps simply out of moral blindness,18 6 is
very reluctant to do so. The insanity defense is limited to an
extremely narrow set of offenders, typically recognizing an
exculpatory claim only in cases involving a psychotic-like cognitive
impairment.18 7 And, in a large number of jurisdictions, the rest of the
criminal code continues to adhere to objective "reasonable person"
tests for mistake and affirmative defenses that contemplate little or no
mitigation for behavioral deficiencies.18 8
The Model Penal Code's attempt to define mens rea is even more
revealing, because the Code represents one of the most rigorous efforts
to subjectify the blameworthiness inquiry.18 9 In its definitions of the
provocation defense, duress, and recklessness (the latter of which is
also relevant, in some circumstances, to the scope of defenses such. as
self-defense), the Code speaks in terms of what a person in the actor's
"situation" would have perceived or experienced. 190  The term is
185. For a recent article expressing this view, see Anders Kaye, Resurrecting the Causal
Theory of the Excuses, 38 NEBRASKA L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
186. Consider these comments from David Dolinko:
[Tihe retributivist mind-set encourages legal actors to brush aside qualms about
whether the wretched economic, social, and psychological background of many
criminals somehow undercuts our right to inflict condign punishment. For if to credit
such qualms is to question the criminal's status as a fully responsible individual, then
respect for the criminal's very personhood counsels us to reject those qualms and to
affirm our deep respect for the offender by refusing to mitigate his punishment no
matter how "deprived" his background.
Dolinko, supra note 119, at 1647-48.
187. See PERLIN, supra note 65, at 120-28 (1994).
188. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 434 (3d ed. 2000) (noting the courts' "uncritical
acceptance of the general statement that the mistake must be reasonable"); id. at 493-94 (noting
that the law "generally require[s] that the defendant's belief in the necessity of using force to
prevent harm to himself be a reasonable one").
189. RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 360 (1997) ('The Model Code treatment of
mistaken belief in the existence of justificatory facts is an essential feature of its general
commitment to the proposition that criminal punishment should be proportional to the
culpability manifested by the defendant.").
190. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962) (providing that an intentional killing is
manslaughter if "committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse [as] determined from the viewpoint of a person
in the actor's situation"); id. § 2.09(1) (recognizing duress as a defense when an offense is coerced
by force or a threat of force "that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have
been unable to resist"); id. § 2.02(2)(c) (defining recklessness as a conscious disregard of a
substantial risk involving "a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor's situation"); id. § 3.09(2) explaining:
When the actor believes that the use of force upon or toward the person of another is
necessary for any of the purposes for which such belief would establish a
justification ... but the actor is reckless or negligent in having such belief or in
acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief that is material to the
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intentionally left undefined in the black letter of the Code, so that it
could, on its face, include virtually any aspect of the individual's
personality or environment, including impairments due to genetics,
psychopathy, trauma, and any of the other factors that behaviorists
think contribute to behavior. Yet, with the possible exception of the
provocation defense (which in any event only applies to homicide), 191
the Code's commentary on these provisions states that the
interpretation of "situation" in these contexts should only allow
consideration of "[s]tark, tangible factors" such as "size, strength, age
or health," not "[m]atters of temperament." 192  Elsewhere, the
commentary indicates that "heredity" and "intelligence" are also not to
be encompassed within the actor's "situation" in appraising these
mental states. 193
The Code's unwillingness to contemplate "internal" factors,
particularly in assessing recklessness, which is the Code's default
mens rea for both offenses and defenses, 194 contradicts its commitment
to blameworthiness based on subjective desert. It may be easier to
discern size and age as compared to intelligence or temperament, but
there is no culpability-based reason for the kinds of distinctions the
Code makes. As a theoretical matter the line-drawing exemplified in
the Code is arbitrary; it evades, rather than faces, the logical
consequences of a desert-based system. 195
justifiability of his use of force, the justification afforded... is unavailable in a
prosecution for an offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be,
suffices to establish culpability.
191. The commentary to the Code § 210.3 notes that, in this provision, "[tihe term
'situation'... is designedly ambiguous and is plainly flexible enough to allow the law to grow in
the direction of taking account of mental abnormalities that have been recognized in the
developing law of diminished responsibility." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART II
72 (1980). However, the commentary later states, "[1]ike temperament or unusual
excitability.., there are surely other forms of abnormality that should not be taken into account
for this purpose." Id. at 73.
192. Id. at 375 (equating definition of "situation" in connection with duress with the
definition of situation in appraising recklessness and negligence and stating that the
qualifications noted in the text apply to both).
193. Id. at 242 n.27 (indicating that these factors "would not be held material in judging
negligence" and then stating the recklessness provision "requires the same discriminations
demanded by the standard of negligence.").
194. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3).
195. In his famous comments about the criminal law, Justice Holmes addressed this
quandary with similar reasoning: "[An] individual may be morally without stain, because he has
less than ordinary intelligence or prudence. But he is required to have those qualities at his
peril. If he has them, he will not, as a general rule, incur liability without blameworthiness."
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 55 (1881). If the individual is one of the many
who lacks ordinary intelligence or prudence, however, then, according to Holmes, he may incur
liability despite being blameless. The reason, Holmes stated, is that the "chief and only
universal purpose of punishment" is "prevention" of criminal conduct, a purpose that trumps the
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The contention is sometimes made that any culpability-
mitigating circumstances not considered at trial can be given due
weight at sentencing. 196 But this gambit admits that culpability is
only of secondary importance in defining crime, prevents juries from
playing the role they are best suited to fill in a desert-based system
and, given the low visibility of sentencing, hides the core decisions
about punishment from the public. 197 If sentencing statutes could
make clear the extent to which various mitigating factors affected
disposition, at least the implications of desert-based punishment
would be clarified. But, as already noted,198 there are no clear criteria
for making these types of distinctions, whether they take place at trial
or at sentencing.
In a recent article, Stephen Morse, a leading retributivist,
concedes as much. Morse agrees both that current criminal law takes
insufficient account of diminished responsibility due to mental and
behavioral impairments, and that the jury, rather than the sentencing
judge, ought to decide whether responsibility is diminished. 99 But
because "we only have the limited ability to make the fine-grained
responsibility judgments that are possible in theory,"200 he eschews
any attempt to grade culpability in a nuanced fashion. Instead he
proposes a generic "guilty but partially responsible" defense that
would reduce sentences by the same amount for every defendant
whose "substantially diminished rationality ... substantially affected
[the] criminal conduct." 201  As Morse states, "[t]his proposal would
lump together for the same degree of reduction defendants convicted
of the same crime but who have disparately impaired rationality and
consequently different responsibility."202  Although he admits that
"[t]his may seem a denial of equal justice," he also asserts that the
goal of punishing only blameworthy acts. Id. at 56. As this Article argues, prevention of
criminal conduct can be achieved without relying on or distorting the blameworthiness concept.
196. Perhaps the most blatant example of this type of reasoning is found in the Montana
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Korrell, 690 P.2d 992, 1000 (1984), which upheld a
legislative decision to abolish the insanity defense because evidence of mental disorder could still
be heard at sentencing.
197. This is still true after the Supreme Court's recent decision in Blakely v. Washington,
124 S. Ct. 2531, 2559 (2004), which only requires factors in aggravation to be decided by juries.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 114-120.
199. Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 289, 294-299 (2003) (arguing that "[piresent law is unfair because it does not
sufficiently permit mitigating claims" and that jury trial determinations are better than judicial
sentencing determinations on this score because sentencing judges might abuse their discretion,
are less acquainted with "community norms," and operate at a less "visible" stage).
200. Id. at 302.
201. Id. at 300 (emphasis deleted).
202. Id. at 304.
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"failure to provide perfect justice in this imperfect world is not a
decisive, or even weighty, objection in this instance."20 3 Evaluations of
weightiness aside, Morse's admissions that the present desert-based
system largely ignores the mitigating impact of biology and situation,
and that even his reform requires significant compromise, suggest
that the punishment model literally cannot do justice to the variety of
human motivation for crime. 20 4
A preventive regime, in contrast, neither ignores the biological
and situational causes of crime nor arbitrarily limits their relevance.
Rather, its individualized dispositions explicitly experiment with
means of reducing their impact. As scientific knowledge about crime
advances, a desert regime will either have to abandon its own
premises or resort to clumsy adjustments, while a preventive regime is
well situated, both in theory and in practice, to integrate new
information into the intervention calculus.
V. CONCLUSION
The punishment model of the criminal law is currently
threatened by the newly popular prevention model of intervention, one
that is based on predictions of risk uncabined by culpability
assessments. This Article has argued that this trend is not
necessarily a bad thing; it may be time to swing the pendulum back
toward a preventive model, albeit with some modifications. A
preventive regime that is limited to interventions after nonaccidental,
unjustified harmful acts, and that engages in competent risk
assessment and risk management, might well be superior to the
current system of criminal justice, or to any system of criminal justice
based primarily on desert, deterrence, or ethical philosophy. Such a
preventive regime would be more effective at preventing crime and
assimilating new scientific information about human behavior, and
probably would be no more inaccurate or costly than the punishment
model of criminal justice. A byproduct of this shift would be the
elimination of the many artificial distinctions between civil and
criminal dispositions described at the beginning of this Article.20 5
203. Id.
204. Morse does countenance one variation on his generic guilty but partially responsible
defense. The discount for diminished responsibility could vary inversely with the seriousness of
the crime, he states, because defendants who commit more serious crimes are "more dangerous"
and thus should be confined for longer periods. Id. at 303. Leaving aside the fact that those who
commit serious crimes are not necessarily more dangerous than those who commit less serious
ones, this concession to public safety raises the question this entire Article has addressed: Why
shouldn't dangerousness replace blame as the core consideration of the criminal law?
205. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
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Deportation, forfeiture and administrative penalties, as well as
imprisonment, all would be aimed at prevention of prohibited conduct
in an effort to protect the public.
Of course, there may be serious constitutional problems with a
preventive model of criminal justice. Although Hendricks upheld the
sexual predator regime, it did so on condition that the state prove that
a "mental abnormality" causes the dangerousness underlying the
commitment. 2 6 As noted earlier, 207 that phrase does not impose a
very potent limitation on commitment. But by no stretch is it
ambiguous enough to cover every person who commits an antisocial
act. Another possible constitutional obstacle to a preventive regime is
its nonchalance toward mens rea. In Morrissette v. United States, for
instance, the Court stated that "[t]he contention that an injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention ... is as universal
and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose between good and evil."20 8 Procedure-related
obstacles to a preventive regime might also arise under the
Constitution. In particular, a system that depends on expert
assessment of risk and treatability could diminish the role of jury
decisionmaking, which the Sixth Amendment requires for all "criminal
prosecutions."20 9
The latter two objections probably do not pose insurmountable
obstacles to a preventive regime. Morrissette notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court has been quite ambivalent about requiring particular
mental states as a matter of due process;210 in any event the regime
206. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) ("A finding of dangerousness, standing
alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary
commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental
abnormality.' ").
207. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
208. 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). The Court also noted Blackstone's statement in the
eighteenth century that crime requires a "vicious will." Id. at 251.
209. U.S. CONST. amend VI. This language has been construed to require jury trials for any
crime that can lead to "punishment" of six months or longer. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 73-74 (1970) ("We cannot.., conclude that ["the benefits that result from speedy and
inexpensive nonjury adjudications"] ... can ... justify denying an accused the important right to
trial by jury where the possible penalty exceeds six months imprisonment."). Therefore, as a
technical matter, a preventive regime relying cn periodic review every six months might elude
the Sixth Amendment's jury trial constraints (although the due process clause would still apply).
210. The Court's language in Morrissette was dictum and in any event was merely in aid of
interpreting a federal statute, not framed as a constitutional requirement. In earlier cases, the
Court had stated that "in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts, the State may in the
maintenance of a public policy provide 'that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and
will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance.'" United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
166 [Vol. 58:1:121
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proposed here would not permit intervention for nonnegligent or
justified acts. And although a preventive system would rely heavily
on experts, it would not have to derogate the roles of juries and judges,
contrary to the claims of some of its opponents. 211 Juries should be
instrumental in determining whether a person committed a
nonaccidental, unjustified harm, and judges should be involved in
monitoring risk assessment and risk management, as occurs in drug
courts. Ultimately, the degree of risk necessary to authorize
intervention, and the restraint on liberty and intrusiveness of
treatment legitimated by a given degree of risk, are moral/legal
questions that laypeople and legal decisionmakers, not clinical
experts, should decide.212
On the other hand, the decision in Hendricks that confinement
based on dangerousness may take place only when linked to
abnormality-recently affirmed by the Court in Kansas v. Crane213-is
not so easily finessed. If that decision stands, implementation of a
preventive regime may not be possible. Added to this constitutional
impasse are the related psychosocial concerns that were discounted
but not dismissed in the foregoing pages. First, it is possible, as
Robinson suggests, that an abrupt end to blaming practices would
250, 252 (1922) (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 70 (1910)). More
recently, in Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 51 (1996), the Court held that Montana's
elimination of the intoxication defense did not violate due process, in large part because the
defense is "of recent vintage." Most other mens rea concepts are relatively recent developments
as well. See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 664 (suggesting that, before the
nineteenth century, the law posited that "the accused acts intentionally unless she can show that
commission of the actus reus was accidental [or] unless she raises one of the recognized
defenses," i.e., self-defense-defined in terms of reasonableness-and infancy and insanity-
defined narrowly); Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 815, 844-45 (1989) (noting that even into the nineteenth century, English courts
did not often conduct serious investigations of subjective mental state). Finally, there is the
interesting statement in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion):
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have
historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension
between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral,
philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has
always been thought to be the province of the States.
Id. at 535-36.
211. C.S. Lewis objected that a preventive regime could "be criticized only by fellow experts
and on technical grounds, never by men as men and on grounds of justice." C.S. Lewis, The
Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224, 229 (1953).
212. See Christopher Slobogin, The "Ultimate Issue" Issue, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 259, 260-61
(1989) (arguing against permitting experts to address ultimate issues such as culpability and
whether intervention may occur based on dangerousness, because "[miental health professionals
are not trained, as are judges, nor institutionally qualified, as are juries, to reach legal or moral
conclusions").
213. 534 U.S. 407, 411-13 (2002).
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undermine the criminal law's legitimacy. 214  Second, even if
determinism is true, a criminal law that appears to endorse the notion
that people cannot control their fate might have a significant
debilitating impact.215 Although this Article contended that a
preventive regime should not have these effects (and that, in any
event, the criminal law is only one among many behavior-shaping
institutions in society), as of yet we do not know enough to evaluate
these claims.
Thus, even if one agrees with the general thrust of the
arguments made here, legal and sociological considerations may
counsel that some aspects of the punishment model be maintained, at
least for a transitional period. Specifically, culpability determinations
might remain a fixture at the trial stage; their retention as a liability
predicate probably satisfies Hendricks,21 6 and their visibility would
assure the public that the criminal justice system still takes blame
seriously. However, once conviction occurs, disposition should be
based on risk management principles; no minimum or maximum
terms would be imposed. Routine risk assessment, periodic review,
community placements and rehabilitation efforts would be the focus of
the postconviction process. That version of indeterminate sentencing,
although not a pure preventive model, might be a significant first step
toward civilizing the criminal law.
214. Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 201, 207 (1996) (arguing that the reason the distinction between civil and criminal systems
persists is that "the human desire to make moral judgments is universal").
215. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74 ("The idea of free
will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system, a statement of fact, but rather a value
preference having very little to do with the metaphysics of determinism and free will.").
216. In finding that commitment under the sexual predator statute at issue in Hendricks
was not punishment, the Court emphasized both the absence of a requirement that the offender
be found criminally responsible for the act and the lack of a "scienter requirement." Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1997). Conversely, if both are required, any postconviction
disposition would probably be considered sufficiently punitive to satisfy due process. Cf.
Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ash, 302 U.S. 51, 61 (1937) ("[The state] may inflict a deserved
penalty merely to vindicate the law or to deter or to reform the offender or for all of these
purposes .... [The offender's] past may be taken to indicate his present purposes and tendencies
and significantly to suggest the period of restraint and the kind of discipline that ought to be
imposed upon him.").
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The Role of Prosecutors in Serving
Justice After Convictions
Fred C. Zacharias 58 Vand. L. Rev. 171 (2005)
This Article addresses prosecutors' ethical duty to serve
justice after convictions are complete. Prosecutorial justice issues
seem to arise less frequently after conviction than at trial. Once
defendants are found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, prosecutors'
natural inclination in balancing the equities has been to sidestep
defense-oriented actions.
Analyzing the obligation to serve justice after convictions is
important precisely because so little attention has been paid to it.
There are at least three reasons why prosecutors are ill-equipped to
analyze their post-trial obligations on their own. First, there is little
law governing the subject. Second, prosecutors' incentives at the
postconviction stage militate against taking action that benefits con-
victed defendants. Third, identifying what it means to serve
justice is a complex task.
Because prosecutors properly embrace a presumption that
convicted defendants have received a fair trial, almost any
prosecutorial reaction that maintains the status quo seems justified.
Nevertheless, once appeals are complete, the prosecutor may be the
only participant in the criminal justice system in a position to rectify
a wrong. Moreover, not all issues implicating postconviction justice
call for action that would help defendants avoid their convictions.
Prosecutors, for the most part, have been left to their own devices in
determining how to balance these considerations.
This Article first sets forth categories of realistic scenarios
that implicate a postconviction obligation to do justice and
discusses the limited case law addressing the subject. It then
identifies ways that prosecutors and rulemakers might think about
the issues. Finally, the Article offers suggestions for how ethics code
drafters and other regulators should begin to resolve some of the core
questions.

